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Beyond vague references to his ‘Eastern’ or ‘Oriental’ influences, there exists almost no 
work on the impact made by Buddhist traditions on the work of Georges Bataille. This 
study takes a first step towards understanding this impact. It embarks upon a reading of La 
Pratique de la joie devant la mort as a record of Bataille’s meditation practice infused with 
Tibetan and Japanese Zen Buddhist concepts and practices as he understood them, through 
the prisms of European interactions therewith. The study traces the evolution of what are 
here termed the ‘imagined Buddhisms’ emerging from such interactions, from early Euro-
Buddhist encounters during the Christian missions, through the 19th-century birth of 
‘Buddhist Studies’ and the related influence of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to an interwar 
avant-garde preoccupied with the rejection of the European values held to have caused 
WWI. Foremost of the avant-garde factions considered here is the secret society Acéphale, 
founded by Bataille with the stated aims of creating a new religion and waging war on 
‘tout ce qui est reconnu aujourd’hui’. In the course of this investigation, a pattern of 
Buddhist traditions weaponised in support of European projects is established; one in 
which they are imagined and re-imagined alternately as equivalent and antagonist to the 
work of Bataille, his peers and their antecedents.  
La Pratique de la joie devant la mort emerges in the light of Bataille’s ‘imagined 
Buddhism’ as a practical version of an inverted Nietzschean sovereignty, incorporating 
elements of the concepts and practices of Tibetan and Japanese Zen Buddhism as he 
understood them. In the former case, these include his method of dramatisation (the 
projection of real or imagined images to bring about a rupture in the psyche) and the idea 
of Tibetan meditation as what he terms a means of ‘put[ting one] to sleep’. Such an 
‘put[ting] to sleep’ is argued to be akin to the what Bataille elsewhere calls the ‘narcotic’ 
of the profane world and to which he offers his own practice as a solution. In the case of 
Japanese Zen, the process Bataille would come to call the opération souveraine is shown 
to be present in La Pratique de la joie devant la mort and to bear resemblance to the 
process of achieving the form of Zen enlightenment called satori. A momentary flash of 
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In Zen Buddhist traditions, ‘Dharma transmission’ refers to the lineage of masters – 
traceable back to Bodhidharma, an Indian monk considered the founder of the tradition – 
through which a student receives the Dharma (the teaching of the historical Buddha). It is 
believed that Bodhidharma brought what became the Ch’an tradition to China sometime in 
the Fifth or Sixth Century, and from there it spread to become Seon in Korea and Zen in 
Japan. The multiplicity of branches inherent to such a lineage means that knowledge of a 
student’s transmission affords insight into the particular approach by which he or she 
studied. The Buddhist traditions and concepts with which Bataille interacted were 
transmitted through a quite different lineage, one of European constructions not only of 
Buddhist traditions and concepts in themselves, but of the cultural and geographic entity 
called ‘the Orient’ in which they were imagined to exist. This study argues that Bataille’s 
‘transmission’ is silent in two senses: firstly, he lacks insight into the origins of these 
constructed ‘Buddhisms’ and ‘Orients’ and secondly, his Buddhist influences go largely 
unreferenced. It is the purpose of this study to draw Bataille’s transmission out of this 
silence, tracing its roots from the earliest Euro-Buddhist encounters, with particular focus 
on the prisms of 19th-century scholarship, the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 
and Bataille’s contemporaries in the avant-garde. It then analyses the eruption of his 
transmission in La Pratique de la joie devant la mort. 
 
La Pratique de la joie devant la mort was the title of a lecture given by Bataille in 1939 to 
the Collège de Sociologie. The notes to that lecture are now lost, but the controversy it 
sparked among the group appears to have been the catalyst for its dispansion. The Collège 
took a theoretical, ethnographic approach to the idea of a ‘sacred sociology’ that would see 
the restoration of the sacred into a society it believed had lost sight thereof.1 This focus on 
theory was the cause of simmering tension between Bataille and other members (notably 
Roger Caillois and Michel Leiris)2 around his perceived mysticism and interest in practical 
explorations of the sacred and of sacrifice as a means to achieve it. These he undertook 
with secret society Acéphale, an organisation which is often understood as the esoteric 
dimension of the Collège3  and whose activities remain largely unknown, in great part due 
 
1 Michel Leiris, ‘The Sacred in Everyday Life’, in The College of Sociology: 1937 - 39, ed. by Denis Hollier 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 24–31. 
2 Andrew Hussey, The Inner Scar: The Mysticism of Georges Bataille (Amsterdam: Brill Rodopi, 2000), p. 
59. 
3 Camille Morando, ‘Le Corps sans Limites ou l’acéphalité : Le personnage d’Acéphale, secret et équivoque, 
dans les Œuvres des Artistes Autour du Collège de Sociologie’, RACAR: Revue d’art Canadienne, 31 (2006), 
81–89., p. 82. 
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to the vow of secrecy maintained by its members. Of what is known, it is of particular 
interest to this study that the group’s interest in sacrifice and the sacred sat within its aim to 
found a new religion with a focus on silent, solo meditation.4 Over the course of the study, 
it shall be shown how this new religion and the meditation practices Bataille developed 
within it, were influenced by his ‘silent transmission’. 
 
In the same month as the fateful lecture, the review Acéphale, organ of the secret 
society, published in its final issue a piece by Bataille also entitled Pratique de la 
joie devant la mort. This consisted of a three-page essay followed by six short 
texts, the first five simply numbered and number six given the additional title 
Méditation héraclitéenne. These texts have been referred to variously as a poem, a 
set of ‘Nietzschean hymns’5 and a series of ‘themes’6 on which Bataille 
meditated. Bataille himself is at pains to say that they are not – barring the first – 
‘exercises’ to be practiced but ‘descriptions’ of the ‘état contemplatif ou [une] 
contemplation extasiée’ in which the practitioner that he calls the mystique de la 
joie devant la mort finds themselves. This he attributes to the fact that such a state 
is so elusive that it is only possible to give a ‘représentation la plus vague’ of it. 
However, in the only study devoted to his meditation practice, Bataille’s friend 
Jean Bruno emphasises that he desperately wanted to create a practice suitable for 
his peers and to share it with them, and indeed in LC he states: ‘j’ai voulu rendre 
accessible…les transports qui semblaient les plus loins d’eux’.7 It is also of note 
that Bataille sent an early draft of PJDM to Isabelle Farner with instructions on 
how to sit to meditate, and how to recite the text as part of this meditation.8  This 
study approaches the texts with this conflict in mind: much as Bataille states that 
the texts are ‘descriptions’ there persists a drive to share his methods and 
experiences: a desire for communication that is at the very heart of his conception 
of the sacred.  
 
 
4 Ibid., p. 81. 
5 Karla L. Schultz, ‘Bataille’s L’Erotisme in Light of Recent Love Poetry’, Pacific Coast Philology, 22 
(1987), 78–87, p. 78. 
6 Jean Bruno, ‘Les techniques d’illumination chez Georges Bataille’, Critique, 195–196 (1963), 706–21, p. 
713. 
7 Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), V., p. 284. 
8 Georges Bataille, The Sacred Conspiracy: The Internal Papers of the Secret Society of Acéphale and 
Lectures to the College of Sociology, ed. by Marina Galletti and Alastair Brotchie (London: Atlas Press, 
2018), p. 451 – 453. 
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Before any analysis of Bataille’s Buddhist influences may be undertaken, it is crucial to 
situate his interactions with Buddhist concepts and traditions in their historical context. 
The last two decades have witnessed increasing scholarly interest in the history of 
European engagement with Buddhist traditions,9 which has highlighted the European 
tendency to create what Droit has dubbed an Orient imaginaire in their dealings with 
Buddhist traditions and cultures. This term refers to the creation of an imagined ‘other’ 
serving as a cipher for Europeans to process events and phenomena in their own cultures.  
In the service of understanding Bataille’s Orient imaginaire, this study analyses the 
‘Orients’ of his influences, from 19th century German philosophy in Chapter One to his 
avant-garde contemporaries in Chapter Two. Key to understanding how these ‘Orients’ 
were created and perpetuated is Andrew Dawson’s theory of the ‘westernisation of the 
East’. Though he notes the difficulty of these terms, saying they ‘[toy] dangerously with 
[talking] of East and West as if they were undifferentiated cultural entities rather than the 
mosaic heterogeneities we know them to be’, Dawson proposes, and this study concurs, 
that there does exist a ‘Western habitus’.10 In this context the interpretation of ‘eastern’ 
concepts through the European lens, rather than ‘easternising the West’ as Campbell has 
argued,11 has had the opposite effect of ‘westernising the East’ in European interactions 
therewith. This study supports the work of Droit and Dawson by showing that the avant-
garde and Bataille in particular, through selective galvanising of Buddhist concepts in 
service of their own projects, ‘westernised’ them, rather than Buddhism having an 
‘easternising’ effect on their own work.  
 
The ‘Orients’ discussed in this study share common ancestry in the long history of 
European interactions with South and East Asian cultures and traditions. This seems to 
have begun with that of the Ancient Greeks, whose relationships with early Buddhists in 
northern India left not insignificant marks on Buddhist literature and culture.12 However, 
 
9 See, amongst others, Donald S. Lopez, Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West (London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998); Westward Dharma: Buddhism Beyond Asia, ed. by Charles Prebish 
and Martin Baumann (Berkeley: University of California Press 2000); Stephen Batchelor, The Awakening of 
the West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western Culture (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1994). 
10 Dawson borrows this term from Pierre Bordieu, see: Andrew Dawson, ‘East Is East, Except When It’s 
West: The Easternization Thesis and the Western Habitus’, Journal of Religion and Society, 8 (2006), 1–13, 
p. 2.  
11 Colin Campbell, ‘The Easternisation of the West’, in New Religious Movements: Challenge and Response, 
ed. by Bryan Wilson and Jamie Cresswell (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 35–48. 
12 For an historical overview of ancient Greek interaction with Buddhist tradition, see Stephen Batchelor, The 
Awakening of the West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western Culture (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1994), 
p. 5 – 15. The early Buddhist text Milinda Pañha, dated between 100-200 BCE, includes a famous series of 
discourses on central Buddhist concepts including anātman, between the Greek king Menander (known 
as Milinda: a Buddhist convert who ruled part of north-west India), and the monk Nagasena. See Henry 
Clarke Warren, Buddhism in Translations (New York, NY: Cosimo, 2005), p. 128 – 133. 
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explicit accounts of interactions with Buddhism were not available to Europeans until the 
time of the Christian missions in the Middle Ages, making them inseparable from the 
Christian perspective and agenda: as shall be discussed throughout this study, this 
underpins European understanding of Buddhism from the Middle Ages to the present day. 
Missionaries, concerned with upholding the veracity of the Christian narrative, were 
chiefly interested in the assimilation of the history and traditions of the cultures with which 
they interacted, to Biblical chronology. As such, they showed a strong interest in the 
discovery of lost versions of Christianity, notably declaring Tibetan Buddhism with its 
monastic system and use of malas and incense a degenerate form of Roman Catholicism.13 
By the Enlightenment, the motive of assimilation remained, but with the focus reversed 
from a Euro- to an Indo-centric perspective in line with Europe’s move away from 
considering itself Christian. This was typified by Voltaire’s argument that there existed 
a doctrina orientalis: the source of all Greek, as well as Asian, philosophy and 
religion.14 This doctrina was in fact a conflation of Brahmanism and Buddhism which in 
this era were understood to be two sects of the same religion rather than the latter being a 
breakaway sect of the former. Just as his missionary antecedents had undermined the 
authority of Tibetan Buddhism with the chronology and beliefs of Roman Catholicism, 
Voltaire used the doctrina orientalis to undermine the authority of the Church. The 
galvanising of Buddhist concepts and traditions in support of European projects, and their 
positioning as alternately equivalent and antagonist to an individual thinker’s philosophy, 
is evident in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bataille and the wider avant-garde and shall be 
discussed throughout this study. The ideas of East-West synthesis and a ‘pan-Asian’ 
religion persisted into the 19th Century. The director of the 
École Spéciale des Langues Orientales, founded in Paris in the late 1700s, admired 
Voltaire’s ideas and extended them to argue that the Bible was an imitation of the Veda 
and it was not until the 1830s that it was realised that Buddhism and Brahmanism were 
separate entities.15 At this point, the unifying term ‘Buddhism’ and the field of ‘Buddhist 
Studies’ as a discipline first appeared. Chapter One addresses the way in which 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche interacted with the work of the tight-knit group of European 
scholars involved in this field. In so doing, it shows how, together, these scholars and 
philosophers brought about one of the most persistent misrepresentations of Buddhist 
 
13 Donald S. Lopez, Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West (London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), p. 22 – 29. 
14 Urs App, The Birth of Orientalism (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), p. 5. 
15 Roger-Pol Droit, The Cult of Nothingness: The Philosophers and the Buddha (University of North Carolina 
Press, 2003), p. 6. 
10 
 
traditions: that which Droit has called the culte du néant. This culte is at the heart of the 
‘imagined Buddhisms’ transmitted by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to Bataille, resting 
upon the erroneous equation of Buddhist nirvāna with self-annihilation, itself made 
possible by the equally erroneous conflation of Brahmanic and Buddhist understandings of 
the self. Before proceeding to an overview of the chapter, it is useful to define these terms. 
Put simply, nirvāna is the cessation of suffering attained by following the eight-fold path 
taught by the historical Buddha. Key to the attainment of nirvāna is the realization of 
selflessness, or anātman. This term shall be considered shortly, but it is crucial to note at 
this juncture that its interpretation as self-destruction has been central to European readings 
of nirvāna as the ‘extinguishing of all trace of physical and mental existence’.16 This is 
certainly the case in Schopenhauer: for that philosopher, Will is the driving force behind 
both the individual self and the world at large, and it is the active negation of Will that 
Schopenhauer finds to be the only answer to suffering. This he equates with nirvāna: 
 
To die willingly, to die gladly, to die cheerfully, is the prerogative of the resigned, of 
him who gives up and denies the will-to-live…he willingly gives up the existence that we 
know; what comes to him instead of it is in our eyes nothing, because our existence in 
reference to that one is nothing. The Buddhist faith calls that existence Nirvana [sic.], 
that is to say, extinction17 
 
Schopenhauer, who was introduced to the Upanishads well before Buddhist traditions, was 
familiar with the Brahmanic understanding of self. In this tradition, the unity behind the 
world is known as brahman, into which the individual ātman (usually translated as ‘soul’ 
but more accurately ‘self’)18 becomes absorbed upon nirvāna. There is therefore an 
individual Self and a universal Self, which is mirrored by Schopenhauer’s Will-as-self and 
Will-as-world. In contrast, Buddhist traditions teach the doctrine of selflessness: anātman. 
This is famously articulated by the analogy of a chariot in the Milindapañha (a dialogue 
between the Buddhist sage Nagasena and the Indo-Greek king Menander, rendered 
‘Milinda’). The word ‘ego’ here is a translation of ātman which as mentioned above is 
more accurately called ‘self’. 
 
 
16 Stephen Batchelor, The Awakening of the West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western Culture 
(Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1994), p. 20. 
17 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E.F.J Payne (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1969), II. p. 508. 
18 Henry Clarke Warren, Buddhism in Translations (New York, NY: Cosimo, 2005), p. 111. 
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The word ‘chariot’ is but a way of counting, term, appellation, convenient designation, 
and name for pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body and banner-staff…in exactly the same 
way, your majesty, in respect of me, Nagasena is but a way of counting, term, 
appellation, convenient designation, mere name for the hair of my head, hair of my 
body…brain of the head, form, sensation, perception, the predispositions, and 
consciousness. But in the absolute sense there is no Ego here to be found19 
 
Anātman is a key point of study across all Buddhist traditions, which also hold that 
realisation of the truth of anātman is at the heart of meditation practice and key to 
nirvāna.20 To give a famous example, in the Genjō Kōan of the Shōbōgenzō the founder of 
the Sōtō school of Japanese Zen, Dōgen, writes: 
 
When we conceive our body and mind in a confused way and grasp all things with 
discriminating mind, we mistakenly think that the self-nature of our own mind is 
permanent. When we intimately practice and return right here, it is clear that all things 
have no [fixed] self21 
 
Schopenhauer’s role in the creation of the culte du néant was established in the ‘close 
agreement’22 he declared Buddhism to have with his own philosophy, with its insistence on 
Will-negation as the answer to suffering. He did not come to this conclusion in a vacuum, 
however: as mentioned above, the small, inter-reliant group of scholars in the newly 
established field of Buddhist Studies read avidly by Schopenhauer were instrumental in 
developing and disseminating this perception of nirvāna. The culte du néant also gained 
traction by dint of the fact that Schopenhauer’s self-declared ‘close agreement’ went 
largely unchallenged, not least by Nietzsche. Chapter One highlights the fact that, in spite 
of roundly criticising Schopenhauer in many other areas, Nietzsche’s interactions with 
Buddhism are with a Schopenhauerian version thereof. The chapter also shows how both 
 
19 Ibid., p. 133. 
20 See, amongst others, Sam Bootle, Laforgue, Philosophy, and Ideas of Otherness (Cambridge: Legenda, 
2018), p. 109; Roger-Pol Droit, ‘Le Bouddhisme et la philosophie du XIXème siècle (I)’’, Le Cahier 
(Collège International de Philosophie), 4 (1987), 182–85; Roger-Pol Droit, ‘Le Bouddhisme et la 
philosophie du XIXème siècle (II: Le cas de Schopenhauer)’, Le Cahier (Collège International de 
philosophie), 5 (1988), 152–57; Roger-Pol Droit, Le culte du néant: Les philosophes et le Bouddha (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 2004) ; Heinrich Dumoulin, ‘Buddhism and Nineteenth-Century German Philosophy’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 42.3 (1981), 457–70, p. 464. 
21 Shohaku Okamura, ‘Lecture 7: Dogen Zenji’s Genjo-Koan’ 
<http://www.thezensite.com/ZenTeachings/Dogen_Teachings/Genjokoan_Okumara.htm> [accessed 14 
October 2019]. 
22 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E.F.J Payne (New York, NY: 
Dover Publications, 1966), II., p. 169. 
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philosophers galvanise Buddhism in support of their own projects, affording it the role of 
both equivalent and antagonist to their philosophies much as their missionary and 
philosophical antecedents had done. Admire their ‘agreement’ though he may, 
Schopenhauer is at pains to state that European philosophy – the ‘calm and dispassionate’ 
Kantian kind in particular – remains the superior vehicle for articulation of their shared 
ideas. In the case of Nietzsche, the galvanisation of Buddhist concepts is writ large in his 
use of Buddhism to discredit Christianity while also casting it as a ‘passive nihilism’ 
inferior to his own ‘active’ version thereof.23 Such an ‘active nihilism’ involves the 
embrace of suffering in the service of self-overcoming leading to the Eternal Return: an 
ever-repeating cycle of events both positive and negative. This is shown to be reliant on a 
minimal self which is also comparable to ātman, ironically making of Nietzsche’s Eternal 
Return a parallel with Buddhist samsāra (the cycle of rebirth from which cessation of 
suffering – i.e. nirvāna reliant on realisation of anātman – affords release). The acceptance 
of Schopenhauer’s ‘close agreement’ extends to the French reception of 19th-century 
German philosophy, which held both he and Nietzsche to have equivalent views with a 
subversive and degenerate ‘Orient’. Foucher de Careil, for example, remarks derogatorily: 
‘grattez un Allemand, vous verrez reparaître l’antique sectateur du Bouddha’24 This ‘sect’ 
or ‘cult’ was understood to be a nihilistic one,25 an interpretation which largely arose not 
from a reading of Buddhist traditions themselves but from Schopenhauer’s equation of 
Buddhism with his own philosophy. The resultant opposition created between German and 
French philosophy included a narrative of the threat of infection by the German ‘mystical’ 
philosophers of the rational, Cartesian French mind, body, and body politic.26 Chapters 
Two and Three investigate the reverse phenomenon: for Bataille and many of his 
contemporaries, both the ‘orient’ and German philosophy would become key weapons in 
an offensive – one which the Acéphale group explicitly referred to as a war –27 against 
Christian morality and the modernist, capitalist values of their era.  
 
 
23 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. by Oscar Levy (London: McMillan, 
1911), XIV, P. 21 <file:///C:/Users/other/Desktop/The-complete-works-of-Friedrich-Nietzsche-VOL-
XIV.pdf> [accessed 12 May 2019]. 
24 Alexandre Foucher de Careil, Hegel et Schopenhauer (Paris: Hachette, 1862), p. 307. 
25 Sam Bootle, Laforgue, Philosophy, and Ideas of Otherness (Cambridge: Legenda, 2018), p.  125 – 129 and 
Anne Staszak, ‘Sociologie de La Réception de Nietzsche En France’, L’année Sociologique (1940 - 1948-), 
48.2 (1998), 365–84, p. 380. 
26 Ibid. 
27 ‘Ce que nous entreprenons est une guerre’ : Georges Bataille, ‘La conjuration sacrée’, Acéphale, 1 (1936), 
1–4, p. 1. 
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Chapter Two widens the focus from the ‘imagined Buddhisms’ of the preceding chapter to 
the Orients imaginaires of an interwar avant-garde in the midst of a violent rejection of 
anything they considered ‘Occidental’. In this context, an idealised, constructed ‘orient’ 
became a weapon against an equally constructed ‘Occident’: a repository of the ‘European’ 
values considered to have led to the horrors of the First World War and to be instrumental 
in the threat of the Second. By the time of Acéphale in 1936, the Second World War 
looming, this rejection was writ large. The group declared themselves to be starting both a 
religion and a war of their own, declaring: ‘NOUS SOMMES FAROUCHEMENT 
RELIGIEUX…ce que nous entreprenons est une guerre’.28 This new religion was to be 
weaponised in the war against ‘tout ce qui est reconnu aujourd’hui.’29 For both the avant-
garde at large and for the Acéphale group and Bataille in particular, Christianity was to 
remain a central enemy in this war.  However, further targets included capitalism (which 
for Bataille was intertwined with Christianity), modernism and colonialism.   
 
In their weaponizing of ‘Orient’ against ‘Occident’, three avant-garde groups in Bataille’s 
circles are considered in Chapter Two, namely the Surrealists, the group who gathered 
around the publication Le Grand jeu including René Daumal, and the dissident surrealist 
Rue Blomet Group of which Bataille was a central member. All three are shown to display 
a concurrent, conscious anti-colonialism and unconscious colonialism. This is evident in 
the fact that, while the ‘Orient’ in general and Buddhist traditions in particular are revered, 
they remain so in the service of European projects. To consider conscious anti-colonialism 
in the first instance: increased availability of scholarship on Buddhist traditions, including 
translations of primary sources, was accompanied by what may be termed a kind of ‘proto-
Orientalism’ (in Edward Saïd’s sense of the term, that is the patronising attitudes of 
Europeans to an imagined ‘East’)30 that acknowledged the problematics of the European 
gaze and was interested in its reversal. This was significantly nuanced, however, by the 
popularity of the Theosophical Society and its problematic presentation of Buddhism, 
particularly the Tibetan form, which included strong reinforcement of white superiority. 
This presentation of Tibetan Buddhism was legitimised by D.T. Suzuki, widely considered 
responsible for the spread of Japanese Zen to Europe and the English-speaking world, and 
to whom we shall return.  
 
 
28 Georges Bataille, ‘La conjuration sacrée’, Acéphale, 1 (1936), 1–4, p. 1. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Edward Saïd, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 2003). 
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Chapter Three discusses Bataille’s treatment of Tibetan Buddhism in the article which 
appeared in Critique of 1947 as Le paradoxe du Tibet and in modified form in LPM of 
1949 as La société désarmée. It is well-known that Bataille often worked on several pieces 
at the same time, and in this case he is known to have been writing LPM at the same time 
as PJDM. The chapter argues in the first instance that Bataille’s analysis of the Tibetan 
system perpetuates his ‘westernised’ understanding of the country and its mythology, 
before arguing that his remarks in Critique and LPM reveal the influence Tibetan practices 
had on Bataille’s own as recorded in PJDM.  Especial attention is paid to the fact that 
Bataille refers to Tibetan meditation practices as a means of ‘put[ting one] to sleep’,31 
chiming with what he called the ‘narcotics’ of work and project existing in the realm of the 
profane.32 It is argued that Bataille responds to these criticisms in PJDM much like 
Nietzsche’s ‘active nihilism’: his practice would supercede both the Tibetan sleeping 
draught and the profane ‘narcotic’ to allow for the eruption of the sacred.  
 
As regards Zen, Suzuki’s Essais sur le bouddhisme zen appears to have been the primary 
source of information on the tradition across the avant-garde. It is the only certain source 
for Bataille, who quotes from it in Sur Nietzsche, although there is a strong possibility that 
he also gleaned information on Zen from André Masson. The latter’s significant interest in 
Zen, to which he was introduced first by the Japanese author Kuni Matsuo, was also 
furthered by Daumal. An accomplished Sanskritist and translator of Suzuki’s Essais, 
Daumal is widely regarded as one of the most authoritative figures of his time on Buddhist 
traditions and may thus be considered a potentially important indirect transmission to 
Bataille. Suzuki’s presentation of Zen has been criticised both in his own time and more 
recently for presenting an historically and culturally inaccurate portrait of Zen, and for 
having nationalistic motives. The problematics of Suzuki’s historical, cultural and doctrinal 
presentation of Zen are fully explored in Chapter Two, while Chapter Three investigates 
the key concepts Bataille took from it. 
 
The Japanese Zen schools have different terms for enlightenment which 
distinguish between the final state of enlightenment (daigo tettei) and momentary 
flashes of insight into the true nature of things. Two of these terms are kenshō and 
satori. Bruno states that Bataille was most interested in what he (Bruno) compares 
 
31 ‘on peut attendre qu’elle endorme plutôt qu’elle n’éveille’ : Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1973), VI, p. 100. 
32 Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), V., p. 10. 
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to kenshō33  and that he experienced this state in 1939, in the forest in which the 
members of Acéphale met.34 The term kenshō is often used interchangeably with 
that of satori, although satori sometimes denotes a ‘higher’ or more intense 
experience and it is this term that Bataille uses in SN after his reading of Suzuki.35 
In the Rinzai school of Zen (descended from the Ch’an Linji school) of which 
Suzuki writes, satori is aided by ‘shock’ or ‘lightning’ techniques which often 
involve physical pain,36 some of which are described in Chapter Three. Suzuki 
also describes satori as ‘the sudden flashing of a new truth hitherto altogether 
undreamed of…a sort of mental catastrophe taking place all at once after so much 
piling of matters intellectual and demonstrative’.37 This sudden eruption of insight 
is compared in Chapter Three to Bataille’s interest in the eruption of the sacred 
from the profane. The sovereign insight into the truth of death as fulfilment of life 
in PJDM is also linked to satori and to Bodhidharma’s declaration that Zen means 
‘for a man to behold his fundamental nature’.38 The image of the lightning strike 
is articulated over and again in Suzuki as well as in Bataille’s work. Notably, 
mirroring the lightning metaphor, Bataille incorporates the image of being struck 
by lightning as a metaphor for sudden awakening in PJDM. He also records what 
appears to be the same moment in SN in the chapter La «Tasse de thé» le «Zen» et 
L’Être aimé39 and uses a lightning-struck tree as the meeting-place for Acéphale. 
It is therefore argued in Chapter Three that the influence of satori and its 
lightning-strike is discernible in the ‘descriptions’ of meditative processes and 
states in Pratique de la joie devant la mort, suggesting that Bataille knew of Zen 
before his reading of Suzuki, probably through André Masson and indirectly 
through René Daumal.40 In illustrating the development of Bataille’s thought and 
practice during the writing of PJDM, the study makes use of earlier versions of 
 
33 Jean Bruno, ‘Les techniques d’illumination chez Georges Bataille’, Critique, 195–196 (1963), 706–21, p. 
719. 
34 Jean Bruno, ‘Les techniques d’illumination chez Georges Bataille’, Critique, 195–196 (1963), 706–21, p. 
712. 
35Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), VI, p. 159 – 160 ; p. 192 – 193. 
36 Thomas P. Kasulis, ‘Ch’an Spirituality’, in Buddhist Spirituality. Later China, Korea, Japan and the 
Modern World, ed. by Takeuchi Yoshinori (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2003). 
37 D.T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (London: Luzac & Company, 1927), p. 245. 
38 Arthur Waley, Zen Buddhism, and Its Relation to Art (London: Luzac & Company, 1922) 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43273/43273-h/43273-h.htm> [accessed 13 November 2019]. 
39 ‘Un peu avant la guerre, je rêvai que j'étais foudroyé. Je ressentis un arrachement, une grande terreur. Au 
même instant j'étais émerveillé, transfiguré : je mourais’ Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1973), VI., p. 75. 
40 Alan Foljambe, ‘An Intimate Destruction: Tantric Buddhism, Desire, and the Body in Surrealism and 
Georges Bataille’ (unpublished PhD, University of Manchester, 2008), p. 129 




these meditations present in the internal papers of the secret society: these were 
only available in English translation at the time of writing, and as such quotations 
from them appear in that language. 
 
Finally, Chapter Three addresses what Ebersholt designates as a key point of intersection 
between ‘Japanese thought’ and French philosophy: that of the limits of language, well-
noted as one of Bataille’s principal concerns. Bataille like Nietzsche before him tussles 
throughout his work with the conflicting desire to communicate and the impossibility of 
communicating in language, and this emerges in his fraught desire to share his meditations 
with his contemporaries in PJDM. As he put it : ‘la communication profonde veut le 
silence’.41 As shall be discussed, for Bataille the state of silence is a dual one from 
language emerges and into which language dissolves: ‘silence’ thus carries the meaning of 






















Imagined Buddhisms: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche 
공에 빠지지 말아라! 
Don’t fall into the void! 
 Seon (Korean Zen) saying 
This chapter explores the construction of Schopenhauer’s Buddhism and its transmission 
through Nietzsche to Bataille. What are here termed their ‘imagined Buddhisms’ were 
grounded in Schopenhauer’s self-declared ‘close agreement’ with Buddhism and 
Nietzsche’s unquestioning acceptance of both this and of Schopenhauer’s reading of 
Buddhism in the development of his own views thereupon. Crucial to this was the 
understanding of the self in Brahmanic terms, that is as ātman (self) which is subsumed 
into the universal brahman upon nirvāna, and may thus be understood as the absorption of 
individual self into greater self. The break of Buddhism with Brahmanism was owed in 
part to the former’s concept of anātman (selflessness). Such a selflessness necessitates that 
there exists no self, either universal or individual, to subsume or to be subsumed, and this 
realization is key to nirvāna. One of the principal problems with Schopenhauer’s 
identification with Buddhism is the debt his owed by his self to the Brahmanic rather than 
the Buddhist tradition. While he does not address the self distinctly, it is, as Zöller notes, 
‘co-extensive with his portrayal of “the world as Will and representation”’.42 
Schopenhauer’s Will underlies the self, and is responsible for its very existence. Like the 
two selves of ātman and brahman, it is the driving force both of the world at large and of 
the individual self specifically: that is, the human self and the selves of animals, plants and 
inanimate objects. The human self is thus inseparable from the ‘self’ of the world. A 
further parallel between Schopenhauer’s conception of self and Brahmanic ātman is his 
notion of character. Fixed and immutable, for Schopenhauer a person’s character is 
constant and inborn. As he puts it: ‘great age, illness, injury to the brain, madness, can 
deprive a man entirely of his memory, but the identity of his person has not in this way 
been lost. That rests on the identical Will and on its unalterable character’.43  For 
Schopenhauer as for the first and second Noble Truths of Buddhism,44 life is suffering and 
 
42 Günter Zöller, ‘Schopenhauer on the Self’, in The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 20. 
43 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E.F.J Payne (New York, NY: 
Dover Publications, 1966), II., p. 239. 
44 The Four Noble Truths are the basis of the Dharma, and are as follows: life is suffering; suffering is caused 
by attachment (both to material items and to fixed ideas, such as the perception of oneself as good or bad, or 
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suffering is caused by attachment: for Schopenhauer, this was specifically to do with 
attachment to individualism which is also a facet of attachment in Buddhist traditions. In a 
dramatic illustration of this, he writes: 
 
In vain does the tortured person [call] on his gods for help; he remains abandoned to 
his fate without mercy. But this hopeless and irretrievable state is precisely the mirror 
of the invincible and indomitable nature of his will, the objectivity of which is his 
person45 
 
However, for Schopenhauer the self can be destroyed through the act of Will-negation, and 
this is the solution he proposes to suffering. Showing that we can actively choose Will-
negation he states that: 
 
at the end of life, if a man is sincere and in full possession of his faculties, he will never 
wish to have it to live over again, but rather than this, he will much prefer to choose 
complete non-existence46 
 
This understanding of the annihilation of a self in line with the Brahmanic ātman as the 
end of suffering, contributed greatly to the European consensus that Buddhism constituted 
what  Droit deems a culte du néant involving ‘une identité…entre bouddhisme, négation 
du vouloir-vivre et pessimisme’.47 Schopenhauer writes:  
 
we have recognized incurable suffering and endless misery as essential to the 
phenomenon of the Will, to the world [and we] see the world melt away with the 
abolished will, and retain before us only empty nothingness48  
 
 
indeed the very fixed idea of self); suffering can be overcome; the overcoming of suffering is achieved by 
following the Eight-fold Path (a set of actions including what is usually translated as ‘right thought’ and 
‘right speech).  
45  Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E.F.J Payne (New York, NY: 
Dover Publications, 1966), I., p. 325 
46 Ibid., p. 324  
47 Roger-Pol Droit, ‘Le Bouddhisme et la philosophie du XIXème siècle (II: Le cas de Schopenhauer)’, Le 
Cahier (Collège International de Philosophie), 5 (1988), 152–57, p. 152. 
48 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E.F.J Payne (New York, NY: 
Dover Publications, 1966), I., p. 411. 
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However, this nothingness also entails a ‘state of bliss in which “only cognition remains, 
the Will has disappeared”’.49 On this account there necessarily remains a self which 
cognises, which Zöller calls a ‘selfless self’.50 Here, ‘selfless’ entails an active -less, in the 
sense that in the active destruction of Will-as-self, some vestige of self is left behind. As 
shall be discussed further in this chapter, the Nietzschean self, though the nature of it is 
hotly debated, may be seen as comparable in its minimal nature.  
 
The imagined Buddhisms of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche existed as part of the wider 
imagined Orients discussed in the introduction to this study, that had developed in the 
European imagination and would re-emerge in Bataille’s context. Central to this 
construction and to the transmission of the two philosophers’ Buddhisms was the influence 
of a tight-knit group of European scholars who first created the field of Buddhist Studies. 
Eugène Burnouf was a principal founder of this discipline and has been considered the 
‘prototype of European understanding of Buddhism.51 Burnouf played a crucial role in 
transmitting the notion of nirvāna as self-annihilation to European readers and scholars, his 
ideas tallying with Schopenhauer’s conflation of the Brahmanic and Buddhist 
understandings of the self which contributed to this misconception. In addition to the 
influence of such scholarship, for both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as for Bataille, there 
exists an ambivalence as regards the constructed ‘Orient’ as a repository of all that is non-
European. This is exemplified by Schopenhauer’s view that European philosophy was 
superior to both Brahmanic and Buddhist traditions in its articulation of Idealism. For 
Nietzsche it is discernible in his subsumption of Buddhism as a ‘passive nihilism’ to his 
own ‘active nihilism’. This ambivalence and the subsumption of Buddhism to both 
philosophers’ projects supports Dawson’s theory that European scholars have continually 
‘westernised the East’ rather than vice-versa.  
Schopenhauer was first exposed to Brahmanic traditions through the orientalist Friedrich 
Majer, whom he met at his mother’s salon in 1814 and who introduced him to the 
Oupnekhat: the Upanishads in Latin, translated from Sanskrit via Persian. This he 
famously credited alongside Plato and Kant as one of the three principal influences for 
WWR. He had no knowledge of Buddhism until after the completion of that work, stating 
explicitly in Volume Two of the first edition that, in spite of the famous ‘close agreement’, 
 
49 Günter Zöller, ‘Schopenhauer on the Self’, in The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 38. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Stephen Batchelor, The Awakening of the West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western Culture 
(Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1994), p. 256. 
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he had not been directly influenced by the tradition.52 Nicholls suggests that 
Schopenhauer’s progressively deeper understanding of what she calls ‘Eastern thought’ is 
evidenced by the references made in his Manuscript Remains53 to works on Buddhism, 
among which Burnouf’s Introduction à l’histoire du bouddhisme indien was key. These 
references grew significantly in number from 1818 – 186054 and in later editions of WWR 
it appears that Schopenhauer is moving further towards specific assimilation of his thought 
to Buddhism. By the 1844 edition of WWR, Cartwright notes Schopenhauer's statement 
that if his philosophy were to become recognised as true, then Buddhism would be the 
religion most adept at articulating such a truth.55 By his 1858 notebook, Schopenhauer was 
asserting that he and the historical Buddha taught ‘essentially the same thing’, and he 
added the latter to Plato and Kant as one of the ‘immortals of philosophy’.56  
Nicholls provides a comprehensive list of Schopenhauer’s sources on Buddhism which 
spans work in French, German and English.57 From this list, it appears likely that 
Schopenhauer read work on a number of traditions, from Burmese Theravāda, to Tibetan 
and Mongolian Buddhism and Chinese Mahāyāna58 before discovering the Pāli canon59 
through the work of Christian missionary Robert Spence Hardy.60 However, the fact that 
Schopenhauer attributed to Spence Hardy a ‘deeper insight into the essence of the Buddhist 
dogma than any other work’61 demonstrates his reliance on European academic sources for 
such insight, which are, in the case of Spence-Hardy, also influenced by Christian ideas 
 
52 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E.F.J Payne (New York, NY: 
Dover Publications, 1966), II., p. 169. 
53 Moira Nicholls, ‘The Influences of Eastern Thought on Schopenhauer’s Doctrine of the Thing-In-Itself’, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 171–212 
<https://www-cambridge-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-
schopenhauer/E8D753063837720CC34284DDAC2780CB> [accessed 5 December 2019], p. 176. 
54 Ibid., p. 177. 
55 David Cartwright, ‘Foreword’ in Barua, Arati (ed.), Schopenhauer on Self, World and Morality: Vedantic 
and Non-Vedantic Perspectives (Singapore: Springer, 2017), p.vi. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Moira Nicholls, ‘The Influences of Eastern Thought on Schopenhauer’s Doctrine of the Thing-In-Itself’, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 171–212 
<https://www-cambridge-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-
schopenhauer/E8D753063837720CC34284DDAC2780CB> [accessed 5 December 2019], p. 197 – 201. 
58 In basic terms, the Theravāda and Mahāyāna are the two most prevalent schools of Buddhism. Theravāda 
(mainly practiced in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) is the older form, with the 
Mahāyāna emerging sometime around the beginning of the Common Era. The designation ‘Mahāyāna’ 
includes the forms practiced in Tibet and Mongolia, and Zen – though sometimes referred to as a third 
distinct school – is also a part of the Mahāyāna tradition. 
59 The set of Buddhist texts central to the Theravāda school. 
60 Moira Nicholls, ‘The Influences of Eastern Thought on Schopenhauer’s Doctrine of the Thing-In-Itself’, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 171–212 
<https://www-cambridge-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-
schopenhauer/E8D753063837720CC34284DDAC2780CB> [accessed 5 December 2019], p. 187. 
61 Ibid., p. 188. 
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and agendas. It seems clear that Schopenhauer was also familiar with Isaak Jacob 
Schmidt’s translation of the Diamond Sutra and although Batchelor holds that this would 
have been the only actual Buddhist text available to him,62 given that Burnouf’s translation 
of the Lotus Sutra – one of the most popular and influential Buddhist texts in the 
Mahāyāna tradition – was published six years before Schopenhauer’s death it is possible 
that he may have read this also. In addition to Burnouf’s Introduction à l’histoire du 
bouddhisme indien, further work consulted by Schopenhauer includes that of civil servants 
of the British Empire and the journals of the Asiatic society of Bengal. While scholars the 
new field of study sought to deconstruct the catch-all term ‘Buddhism’ – arguably an 
admirable and long-overdue goal – their perspectives and methods were questionable. 
Writing from the perspective of Europeans (including Spence Hardy as a Christian 
missionary and in the case of the civil servants and the Asiatic Society, members of the 
colonising class), they applied the principles of scientific study used in their native 
scholarly tradition to a context unsuited thereto. Two prime examples of this are firstly the 
fact that the concepts of ‘religion’, ‘God’ and ‘philosophy’ are widely untranslatable into 
the languages of Buddhist traditions, and secondly that the text had none of the primacy 
afforded to European texts in general and to religious texts specifically. Rather, texts in the 
Buddhist canon are and were intended to be transmitted orally from master to student in 
addition to being read and true understanding was and is considered to be impossible 
without the additional accompaniment of individual meditation practice. Burnouf was a 
key proponent of the study of Buddhism by European methods with no need for knowledge 
of its varied, contextualised practices: a position echoed by Schopenhauer’s privileging of 
European philosophical language to articulate the ‘truths’ shared by himself and the 
Buddhist tradition. Burnouf’s interpretation of nirvāna as annihilation has also had far-
reaching effects. He consistently emphasises this definition, citing both the Sanskrit 
etymology of the term and texts such as the dialogue between the historical and Mahamati 
from which he understands nirvāna as the ‘absolute annihilation of subject and object’.63 In 
addition to Burnouf, one of the most polemical texts on the nihilism of Buddhism emerged 
in Jules Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire’s reading of the same sources available to Schopenhauer, 
including Burnouf, to whose nihilistic interpretation of nirvāna he would have been 
exposed. As Droit notes, although original Buddhist texts had begun to appear, European a 
 
62 Stephen Batchelor, The Awakening of the West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western Culture 
(Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1994), p. 256. 
63 Eugène Burnouf, Introduction to the History of Indian Buddhism, trans. by Katia Buffetrille and Donald S. 
Lopez (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 476. 
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priori ideas influenced their readings making Burnouf ‘le fils de son temps’64 in his 
reading and representation of Buddhism and causing Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire to read into 
Buddhism a ‘fanatisme du néant’.65 Le Bouddha et sa religion of 1860 was widely 
circulated and very much prejudiced against Buddhism and Buddhists, as typified by his 
statement that:  
 
On pourrait se demander si l'intelligence de ces peuples est faite comme la nôtre; et si, 
dans ces climats où la vie est en horreur et où on adore le néant à la place de Dieu, la 
nature humaine est bien encore celle que nous sentons en nous66   
 
In spite of the fact, then, that as Ryan puts it ‘conjecture and supposition held the field’67 in 
mid-19th-century European Buddhist scholarship, Schopenhauer remains considered ‘well-
read’ on what is often problematically referred to as ‘Indian philosophy’, ‘Eastern thought’ 
or ‘Asian religions’. If we consider Schopenhauer’s Eurocentrism, inflected by the creation 
of his own ‘Buddhism’, this is certainly contestable. Though it was clearly no fault of 
Schopenhauer’s that he did not have access to more reliable sources, much contemporary 
scholarship seems to equate ‘reading what was available’ with ‘being well-read,’ 
particularly as it studiously ignores his lack of access to primary texts beyond Schmidt’s 
Diamond Sutra and possibly Burnouf’s Lotus Sutra. Cartwright refers to Schopenhauer’s 
‘life-long task of keeping up-to-date with the emerging literature on Eastern philosophy 
and religion’68 which would be more accurate, specifying as it does that he was reading the 
scholarship of Europeans and not the texts themselves.  
 
Schopenhauer’s own projects, his ambivalence regarding ‘Indian philosophy’ and his 
insufficient access to sources on Buddhism thus meant that his philosophy, as Abelsen 
suggests, carries a similar ‘atmosphere’69 to Buddhism which is much more nuanced than 
the equivalence Schopenhauer and numerous scholars suggest. As shall be shown in 
Chapter Three, the same factors were at play during Bataille’s era: he and his peers 
employed Buddhist and Brahmanic concepts in the service of their own projects and 
 
64 Roger-Pol Droit, ‘Le Bouddhisme et la philosophie du XIXème siècle (I)’’, Le Cahier (Collège 
International de Philosophie), 4 (1987), 182–85 p. 183. 
65 Ibid., p. 184. 
66 Jules Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Le Bouddha et sa religion (Paris: Didier, 1860), p. 180. 
67 Christopher Ryan, Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Religion: The Death of God and the Oriental 
Renaissance (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), p. 6. 
68 Arati Barua (ed.), Schopenhauer on Self, World and Morality: Vedantic and Non-Vedantic Perspectives 
(Singapore: Springer, 2017), p. v. 
69 Peter Abelsen, ‘Schopenhauer and Buddhism’, Philosophy East and West, 43.2 (1993), 255–78, p. 255. 
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displayed ambivalence towards the value of ‘Asian religions’ and cultures compared to 
European thought. They were also largely exposed to Buddhism through European work 
which entailed both consciously anti-colonial and unconsciously colonial perspectives and 
agendas.  Where Bataille and his contemporaries depart from 19th-century philosophy and 
scholarship is in their attraction to the meditative practices and related insufficiency of 
language that Schopenhauer – privileging the written word in the European philosophical 
tradition – did not value.70  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the employment of ‘Asian religions’ in 
support of European projects – both pro- and anti-Christian – has been a path well-trodden 
in the history of European interactions with Buddhism.71 This emerges in Schopenhauer’s 
argument for the chronological precedence of Hinduism and Buddhism to Christianity,72 in 
which he claims that the New Testament has Indian roots. His belief in the superiority of 
these religions to Christianity was also concurrent with a wider 19th-century interest in 
finding common roots between ‘Asian’ and European religions.73 This sought to prove the 
existence of an ‘Aryan race’ connecting the heritage and traditions of Europe with those 
considered superior in India. The roots of European civilisation and religion, and indeed all 
that was of worth, may thus be seen to have been reimagined as lying in an ‘Orient’ of 
European construction. By the 1844 edition of WWR Schopenhauer had gone beyond 
borrowing from diverse Brahmanic and Buddhist traditions to a philosophy of religion 
asserting ‘man’s need for metaphysics’: one which manifests as philosophies and religions 
worldwide asserting the same broad truths.74 Schopenhauer argues that the ‘religious 
traditions of India [were] repositories of religious stories and allegories’ which would 
allow the essence – the  core ethics and spirituality of the Christian religion, for example 
the ever-present nature of suffering and the need for salvation through selflessness and 
self-denial75 – to persist even though its metaphysics was proven to be false. However, for 
Schopenhauer such traditions were an inferior vehicle for these truths precisely because it 
 
70 Benjamin A. Elman, ‘Nietzsche and Buddhism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 44.4 (1983), 671–86 (p. 
684). 
71 Urs App, The Birth of Orientalism (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Roger-Pol Droit, Le culte du 
néant: Les philosophes et le Bouddha (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2004). 
72 Robert Bruce Cowan, ‘Nietzsche’s Attempted Escape from Schopenhauer’s South Asian Sources in “The 
Birth of Tragedy”’, German Studies Review, 30.3 (2007) 537–56, p. 541.  
73 Urs App, The Birth of Orientalism (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Stephen Batchelor, The 
Awakening of the West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western Cultures (Berkeley: Parallax Press); Roger-
Pol Droit, Le culte du néant: Les philosophes et le Bouddha (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2004). 
74 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E.F.J Payne (New York, NY: 
Dover Publications, 1966), II., p. 160. 
75 Christopher Ryan, Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Religion: The Death of God and the Oriental 
Renaissance (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), p. 20. 
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presented them through myth and allegory rather than the ‘calm and dispassionate 
presentation’76 made by Kant, whose articulation of Idealism he holds to be superior both 
to those traditions and to his third core influence, Plato. For Ryan, this signifies – and this 
study agrees – that Schopenhauer ‘relegat[es] Indian thought to the status of a precursor to 
European philosophy’,77 a relegation which sits within his wider project of situating Indian 
civilisation at the root of the European. Additionally, it is notable that Schopenhauer here 
privileges language in a way that Nietzsche questions and with which Bataille struggles 
vehemently, as shall be discussed in Chapter Three. Schopenhauer’s need for metaphysics 
is echoed by Nietzsche’s ‘European Buddhism’ which was – as he put it – 
‘indispensable’78 only as a stepping stone between degenerate Christianity and his own 
‘active nihilism’. Like Droit, Ryan supports the argument that Europe’s 19th-century 
interactions with their perceptions of ‘Asian religions’ correlated as in Nietzsche with 
widespread loss of Christian faith. This continued into the 20th century, extending to 
include all values considered ‘Occidental’, as shall be discussed in the following chapter. 
In the case of anti-Christianity, Nietzsche’s ‘active nihilism’ as an alternative to 
Christianity with the ‘stepping stone’ of Buddhist traditions finds echoes in Bataille’s 
meditation practice. This was situated in the larger context of Acéphale’s desire to create a 
new religion, as part of which Bataille borrowed piecemeal from various religious 
traditions. Of these, his Tibetan and Japanese Zen sources are to be explored in Chapter 
Three.  
 
The ambivalence discussed above, of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as regards Buddhist 
traditions, may be considered two-fold: in the first instance towards ‘Indian’ thought and in 
the second towards religion in general. In the former sense, undermining Janaway’s 
comment that Schopenhauer is ‘surprisingly un-Eurocentric,’ 79 it arguably in fact reflects 
his Eurocentrism. Schopenhauer’s ambivalence towards religion as a need but not one that 
is altogether admirable and certainly not in the form of Christianity re-emerges with 
significant differences in both Nietzsche and Bataille. Nietzsche, while vehemently 
attacking the Christian religion in AC, distinguishes its doctrine from the lived experience 
of Jesus to argue that Jesus was the only true Christian and his practice and lived 
 
76 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E.F.J Payne (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1969), P. 142. 
77 Christopher Ryan, ‘Schopenhauer on Idealism, Indian and European’, Philosophy East and West, 1 (2015), 
18–35, p. 18. 
78 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. by Oscar Levy (London: McMillan, 
1911), XIV, P. 107 <file:///C:/Users/other/Desktop/The-complete-works-of-Friedrich-Nietzsche-VOL-
XIV.pdf> [accessed 12 May 2019]. 
79 Christopher Janaway, ‘Schopenhauer’ (London School of Economics, 2019). 
25 
 
experience were the true ‘Christianity’. On this account, the doctrine is a set of symbols 
pointing to an inarticulable truth, which has been taken literally and spun into a 
‘faith’.80  Echoing Schopenhauer’s metaphysical need, Nietzsche calls Jesus a ‘mountain, 
lake and pastoral preacher who strikes us as a Buddha on a soil only very slightly Hindu’81 
and holds that he would have used Hindu or Daoist concepts in support of the inarticulable 
truth, had he been native to those cultures. As for Bataille, his quest to create a new 
religion might seem to exemplify the ‘need for metaphysics’. However, his galvanising of 
Tibetan and Japanese Zen concepts and practices carry echoes of Nietzsche’s privileging of 
the lived experience of Jesus as opposed to the doctrine that grew up after his (Jesus’) 
death: he is fundamentally concerned not with metaphysics but with practice. 
 
As discussed, the ‘refractory nature of European understanding of Buddhism and 
Vedanta’82 is typified by Schopenhauer’s perception of both traditions as confirmation of 
his own philosophy. This is crucial to understanding Nietzsche’s Buddhism in that contrary 
to his wide-ranging criticism of Schopenhauer, having first encountered Buddhist concepts 
in Schopenhauer’s work he never questioned that philosopher’s equation of Buddhism with 
his own. This goes some way to explaining Nietzsche’s claim that Buddhism constitutes a 
‘passive nihilism’,83 that is calm acceptance of one’s own suffering, a term to be returned 
to later in this chapter. This should, he proposed, be superseded by his ‘active’ form 
thereof by means of the active embrace of suffering as a means of growth (that is, self-
overcoming) leading to the Eternal Return (a timeless cycle of recurring events, both 
positive and negative). As he writes in BGE:  
 
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering - know ye not that it is only this discipline 
that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto?84  
 
 
80 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. by Oscar Levy (London: T.N. Foulis, 
1911), XVI, § 39 
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However, and as shall be discussed further, on a Buddhist account the Eternal Return bears 
an ironically close resemblance to samsāra: cyclic existence to which beings are bound by 
attachment and by dint of perpetual rebirth, continue to suffer. 
 
In WP, Nietzsche deems the process of self-overcoming through suffering to constitute the 
Will to Power: this replaces Schopenhauer’s annihilation of Will (also called the Will to 
Life) as the underlying force behind the world. For both, the conception of Will informs 
their definitions of sovereignty, a term to which we shall return. For Schopenhauer, Will-
negation is the sovereign act while for Nietzsche it is the embrace of suffering. Where 
Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s ideas of Will converge however, is in the resemblance 
they both bear to ātman. While WP portrays the Nietzschean self as a non-essential 
collection of competing drives, scholarly debate rages between those who argue purely for 
this definition85 and those who argue for a transcendental self based on the fact that one 
cannot overcome the self without a self to overcome and/or one to do the overcoming.86 
Anderson along with Nehamas and Janaway87 occupies a middle ground, concluding that 
the Nietzschean self is ‘minimal’, existing as a ‘numerically distinct psychological object, 
over and above its constituent drives and affects’ but which nevertheless falls short of a 
definite and transcendental self. 88 As opposed to what Zöller dubs Schopenhauer’s 
‘selfless self’ (discussed above), in which a vestige of self remains after the Will’s self-
destruction, the minimal Nietzschean self exists to be cultivated in the service of the ideal 
of self-creation.89 WP also sits in contrast to Nietzsche’s assertion in BGE that, like ātman: 
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…at the bottom of our souls…there is certainly something unteachable, a granite of 
spiritual fate, of pre-determined decision and answer to predetermined, chosen 
questions. In each cardinal problem there speaks an unchangeable ‘I am this’90 
 
Nietzsche’s sources on Buddhism aside from Schopenhauer are ambiguous. Scholars have 
presented diverse views on the extent of his reading, from Dumoulin who holds that he 
owed his understanding of  Buddhism entirely to his reading of Schopenhauer and never 
studied it with any rigour91 to Welbon who suggests that Nietzsche may have been one of 
the most knowledgeable Europeans on the subject of Buddhism in his time, claiming he 
probably learned Sanskrit between 1865 to 1868.92 Morrison cites three notable works read 
by Nietzsche, namely Max Müller’s and Hermann Oldenberg’s studies of the Pāli form of 
Buddhism and Karl Friedrich Koeppen’s 1857 work Die Religion des Buddha on Tibetan 
and Mongolian Buddhism. It is significant that, according to Morrison, Koeppen’s was the 
first work on Buddhism that he read, in which the latter defines nirvāna and Buddhism in 
the following terms, further cementing its misreading as self-annihilation: 
 
Nirvāna is first and foremost the total extinction of the soul, the extinction in 
nothingness, plain destruction…Nirvāna is the blessed Nothingness: Buddhism is the 
gospel of annihilation93 
 
The representation of Nietzsche as ‘well-read’ as in Welbon’s account is questionable in 
similar terms to Schopenhauer’s perceived expertise in Buddhism in that he remains 
influenced by European accounts both in his own reading and in that of Schopenhauer. As 
to his own reading, it could be argued that by means of the influence of Koeppen and 
potential other sources, and certainly by means of his taking Schopenhauer’s Buddhism as 
representative, he absorbed into his own Buddhism a range of European readings thereof. 
This then gave rise to a confused and conflated ‘Buddhism’ of his own: a ‘passive 
nihilism’ with the notion of nirvāna as self-annihilation at its core. Nietzsche’s 
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intertwining of Schopenhauer with Buddhism is particularly evident in the fact that, where 
he mentions the latter he usually mentions the former as well: an example of this may be 
found in GS, when Nietzsche states that Wagner is attempting to usher in a ‘Buddhistic 
era’, i.e. a 'passively nihilistic' one which is influenced by Schopenhauer. In WP, Nietzsche 
also conflates the Buddhist, Christian and Schopenhauerian view, saying they hold the 
view that ‘it is better not to be than be’.94 This simultaneous conflation of Buddhism and 
Christianity, and his use of the former to discredit the latter, echoes the timeline of 
European interpretations of Buddhism discussed in the introduction to this study. Like his 
predecessors and in advance of the figures to be discussed in Chapters Two and Three, 
including Antonin Artaud, André Breton and René Daumal as well as Bataille, Nietzsche’s 
Buddhism functions in the service of his own projects. These include, as Davis and Elman 
have said, his weaponization of Buddhism against Christianity,95 but they are also 
galvanised in support of his wider proposal of a world-embracing philosophy in the form 
of the Eternal Return. Elman sums up Nietzsche’s attitude in AC as his ‘bending over 
backwards to paint Buddhism in a bright light – as if to prove how much contempt he has 
for Christianity’.96 Among the many references Nietzsche makes to Buddhism in this 
context, in WP he sets up the explicit opposition of ‘Buddha versus Christ’97 and refers to 
Christianity as a religion of ressentiment.98 This term refers to what Nietzsche deems the 
‘slave morality’ of resenting all that is different to itself, namely those in power, their 
happiness and possessions. This leads to a suffering and a mediocrity that, because it is at 
the heart of Christianity, is therefore at the heart of Western civilisation and represents the 
biggest threat thereto. For Nietzsche, Buddhism’s ‘first duty’ is by contrast to fight such 
ressentiment.99 He also admires the Buddha’s commitment to achieving enlightenment in 
the here and now, rather than salvation in an idealised ‘beyond’. This in turn supports his 
‘active nihilism’. Like Schopenhauer, however, Nietzsche’s relationship with Buddhism is 
an ambivalent one. As mentioned, concurrent with his positive representation of the 
tradition, Nietzsche paints Buddhism as a ‘passive nihilism’: a response to meaningless 
 
94 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. by Oscar Levy (New York: 
McMillan, 1911), XV, P. 159 <https://holybooks-lichtenbergpress.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/The-
complete-works-of-Friedrich-Nietzsche-VOL-XVII.pdf> [accessed 5 December 2019]. 
95 Bret W. Davis, ‘Zen after Zarathustra: The Problem of the Will in the Confrontation between Nietzsche 
and Buddhism’, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 28 (2004), p. 89 ;  Benjamin A. Elman, ‘Nietzsche and 
Buddhism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 44.4 (1983), 671–86, p. 681. 
96 Benjamin A. Elman, ‘Nietzsche and Buddhism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 44.4 (1983), 671–86, p. 
681. 
97 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. by Oscar Levy (London: McMillan, 
1911), XIV, P. 129 <file:///C:/Users/other/Desktop/The-complete-works-of-Friedrich-Nietzsche-VOL-
XIV.pdf> [accessed 12 May 2019].  
98 Ibid., p. 130.  
99 Ibid., p. 170. 
29 
 
that ‘cheerfully’ accepts it.100 To elaborate: whereas Christianity desires mastery over its 
‘slaves’ by the concepts of good and evil, on Nietzsche’s account Buddhists do not go 
beyond these notions in a life-affirming way. This means that they do not embrace 
suffering as a means of growth, but in the spirit of accepting their own powerlessness. For 
Nietzsche’s ‘Buddhists’, powerlessness is a fundamental part of existence; of the world as 
it is.101 However, as Davis has noted, ‘active nihilism’ parallels ‘the masters’ great 
reaffirmation of life’ at the core of Zen teachings. Davis thus poses the question of whether 
Nietzsche, had he known of Zen, would himself have drawn this parallel.102 As it is, the 
Eternal Return, as discussed above, finds an ironic parallel in samsāra.  It is perhaps 
significant therefore, that Bataille’s inversion of Nietzschean sovereignty as the embrace of 
death as an essential part of the as it is (indeed, as the fulfilment of life) rather than 
embrace of life, occurs in a context where he becomes aware of Zen. However, the seeds 
of such an inversion can also be discerned as early as 1924 when Bataille and Michel 
Leiris along with Jacques Lavaud considered founding a movement called Oui: rather than 
Dada which provocatively said ‘no’ to world as it was and which Bataille denounced as 
‘not stupid enough’,103 Oui would acquiesce to everything.104 
 
The ‘silent transmission’, from Schopenhauer through Nietzsche to Bataille, of ātman-like 
self and nirvāna as self-annihilation, is furthered by the French Idealist movement which 
bridges the gap from 19th-century German Idealism to the interwar avant-garde and 
Bataille specifically. Particular parallels have been drawn between the philosophies of 
Léon Brunschvicg and Henri Bergson. In the case of the former, his work is described by 
Aron in Schopenhauerian terms as holding that ‘le monde est notre représentation’.105 In 
Les Ages d’Intelligences, Brunschvicg also apparently aligns himself with the Buddha’s 
teaching on the individual route to Enlightenment, grounded in internal transformation 
rather than external solution.106 The fundamental concept of world as representation is also 
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discernible in Bergson’s work and he is aligned by Jacoby with Schopenhauer. Like that 
philosopher, he describes understanding as merely a ‘lantern’ which shines its light upon 
matter107 and his élan vital has been equated with the Will to Life.108 Bergson’s philosophy 
was wholeheartedly embraced by the first Japanese students of philosophy and – crucially 
for this study – by Suzuki, a significant influence on Bataille and his peers, who drew 
explicit parallels between Bergson’s philosophy and that of Zen Buddhism. Meanwhile, 
Bataille was well aware of Bergson, having met with him and read his work on laughter in 
1920.109  Bergson’s work has been credited as an unreferenced influence on Bataille’s 
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In the Shadow of War: Avant-garde Weaponisation of the Orient imaginaire 
 
The West perceives some lack within itself and fantasizes that the answer, through a 
process of projection, is to be found somewhere in the East 
 
Donald S. Lopez, Prisoners of Shangri-La111 
 
Widening the focus from Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s constructed Buddhisms, this 
chapter considers the avant-garde construction of Droit’s Orient imaginaire.112 The 
anti-Christianity discussed in the previous chapter was certainly a motivating factor in 
Bataille’s interactions with Buddhist traditions, as it was for those of the wider avant-
garde. However, the context in which the avant-garde existed included the long shadow 
cast by the First World War which Baishanski describes as ‘le point de depart de toute 
une réflexion sur ce que représente la civilisation occidentale, jusque là la seule digne 
de ce nom’.113 In addition, Surya notes that the senselessness of the war and the disdain 
for authority brought home by its soldiers were the inspiration for several 
contemporary artistic and philosophical projects, most famously Dada and 
Surrealism.114 This chapter considers the work of three key avant-garde groups with 
links to Bataille whose reflections on their context led to a rejection not only of the 
Christian religion but of all that was considered occidental. These are the Grand Jeu 
group which formed around the publication of that name and included René Daumal, 
the Surrealists, and the dissident surrealist Rue Blomet group to which Bataille and 
André Masson were central. Many of such interactions were superficial, relying on 
vague concepts of ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ and the galvanizing of decontextualised 
artwork and artefacts from South and East Asian cultures, which had arrived in Paris in 
the early 20th century. This reflects and refracts the influence of the 19th-century 
Oriental Renaissance, in which writers such as Laforgue, Flaubert and Hugo had 
interested themselves in the ‘novel, transgressive and diversionary value’ of East 
Asian motifs.115 In the art world, Redon and Gaugin had incorporated East Asian 
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motifs into their work and Van Gogh had been among the foremost to embrace the 
craze of japonisme, incorporating Japanese themes and techniques into his work 
(notably the use of  ukiyo-e wood blocks) with little to no understanding of the culture 
from which such methods had emerged. The idea of nirvāna as self-annihilation also 
persisted in the interwar years as a result of continued false conflation of ātman and 
anatman. However, there were those whose interactions with Buddhist traditions and 
cultures were significantly more informed, of whom it is generally agreed that Daumal 
was among the foremost. An accomplished Sanskritist and translator of Suzuki’s 
Essays in Zen Buddhism, Daumal was instrumental to Masson’s understanding of Zen. 
A second key influence was Japanese author Kuni Matsuo who introduced Masson to 
Zen art (which became discernible in the 1950s when he drew ‘almost exclusively in 
the mode of Zen and Ch'an Buddhist art’)116 and told him that his near-death 
experience on a WWI battlefield amounted to one of satori. Given the close friendship 
and working relationship of Bataille and Masson, who has been called ‘Bataille in 
pictures’,117 this chapter suggests a silent transmission of Zen concepts from Daumal to 
Masson to Bataille. 
 
By the 1930s, as the Second World War loomed, the avant-garde were weaponising 
Buddhism in a metaphorical war that pitched their Orient imaginaire against an Occident 
which may be considered equally imaginary: supporting ‘the romantic notion that “people 
of whom we know little or nothing have all the virtues we lack”’,118 the features of such an 
Occident included, in addition to Christianity, those they most opposed: reason, modernity, 
and capitalism. Bataille’s antipathy to the first is stated by his biographer, who declares 
him to be ‘only interested in those questions to which reason declares itself powerless to 
respond’.119 As to modernity and capitalism, Bataille had witnessed the reduction they 
engendered, of human experience to the world of things and utility. Such a world is one 
which, during the time of the Collège de Sociologie and Acéphale, he would come to call 
the profane and from which he would show an interest in the emergence of the sacred. 
Goux and Winnubst point to the centrality of intertwined Calvinism and capitalism to the 
profane world, showing Bataillean sacrifice, leading to the emergence of the sacred, to be 
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an escape from these systems and structures of industrial European society.120 The 
emergence of the sacred through sacrificial rupture of the profane world, and the parallels 
this finds with Zen satori, are to be explored in the following chapter. 
 
It is a central argument of this chapter that the metaphorical war against the Occident led to 
a conscious anti-colonialism and unconscious colonialism among the avant-garde: while 
the Orient is seemingly revered, it is so in the service of avant-garde projects and is 
accordingly cut to fit their parameters. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Buddhism 
weaponised by the avant-garde was certainly transmitted through 19th-century German 
philosophy and scholarship, and French Idealism. However, it was also inflected by an 
increase in availability of primary texts and a more established body of scholarship. This 
was a double-edged sword in that, while there was better understanding of Buddhist 
traditions, the overall perception of Buddhism as a culte du néant persisted: 
Schopenhauer’s claim to equivalence with Buddhism and Burnouf’s assertion that nirvāna 
equated with self-annihilation remained unchallenged, as did the conflation of Brahmanic 
ātman and Buddhist anātman. Additionally, Dawson’s ‘westernisation of the East’ 
remained in evidence by dint of the fact that Buddhism had become cemented as an ‘-ism’ 
to be scrutinised through the lens of European languages, systems and perceptions. 
Improved access to Buddhist texts was also nuanced by a nascent body of popular 
literature on the ‘Orient’ and Buddhism (most pertinently for Bataille the travel writing of 
Alexandra David-Néel) and by the Theosophical Society’s propagation of a problematic 
interpretation of Buddhist traditions. The latter was further problematised by the support it 
received from Suzuki, a controversial figure both in himself and in regard to his 
presentation of Japanese Zen to a European audience. Widely considered to be responsible 
for the spread of Zen to the USA and Europe and the source of Bataille’s notes on Zen in 
SN, Suzuki’s complex role in the construction of European perceptions of Japan and 
Japanese Zen; Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism, are discussed in this chapter. 
 
In contrast to the limited circle of scholars and dearth of primary sources available in the 
mid-1800s, by the interwar years the discipline of Orientalism had made its way to 
academia as demonstrated by the founding of the École d’Orientalisme at the Sorbonne. 
Meanwhile, the École de Langues Orientales was attended by both Daumal and Bataille, 
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where the latter studied Tibetan and Classical Chinese in the early 1920s.121 Exhibitions of 
Buddhist art at the beginning of the century were widespread, most importantly at the 
Musée Cernuschi and the Musée Guimet. Foljambe holds these exhibitions to have opened 
up ‘a genuine aesthetic, and possibly philosophical, alternative to the disenchanted artists 
of the Parisian avant-garde’.122 However, for the most part such an alternative did not do 
fully away with the superficial spirit of the Oriental Renaissance: both artists and thinkers 
can be seen to engage with the exhibitions on a level of flavouring their own projects with 
something new and ‘other’, or using vague ideas of a now-fashionable ‘oriental wisdom’ to 
support them. The Musée Cernuschi’s Quatrième Exposition des arts de l’Asie: art 
bouddhique of 1913 and the Musée Guimet’s holdings of Tibetan manuscripts and objects 
were instrumental in bringing Tibetan art and traditions to a French audience. The former 
included 695 items, 85 of which were of Tibetan origin, including masks, bronzes, 
paintings and artefacts. In literature, the spiritual and geographical ‘other’ of an Orient 
imaginaire against which Europe explored and defined itself was as present as it was in the 
preceding century: avant-garde publications large and small reflect the creation of a such 
‘Orients,’ each reflective of their various groups’ individual projects. A specific interest in 
Japanese art and culture and in the religious and cultural practices of Tibet are discernible: 
some of the most important literary publications of the interwar period, among them La 
Nouvelle Revue Française, Hermès and Les Cahiers du Sud, carried translations of 
Japanese poems and Tibetan texts as well as pieces on ‘l’âme japonaise’ and Tibetan 
yoga.123 
 
For some, an idealised Orient was constructed in response to an Occident considered to 
be failing in the arena of spirituality. Crucially, and certainly in the case of Acéphale in 
general and Bataille’s meditation practice specifically, there was an interest in exploring 
spirituality on the level of personal experience rather than from an academic, conceptual 
perspective. As Baishanski puts it: 
 
Cet intérêt pour les traditions spirituelles et les philosophies d'Asie…ne débouche pas 
sur une connaissance d'exégète, gratuite et toute cérébrale, mais sur une 
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connaissance qui va servir dans la vie quotidienne, qui va transformer la façon de 
penser et de vivre de celui qui la détient124 
 
In addition to the rejection of European culture and values demonstrated above, a critique 
of what Saïd would come some decades later to call Orientalism125 was beginning to 
emerge. One of the earliest examples of the reversal of the European gaze had arrived 
with Victor Segalen: a travel writer who, along with Alexandra David-Néel, had a 
profound effect in certain quarters of the avant-garde, not least on the Surrealists. In 
addition, criticism of European colonialism existed in tandem with a more unmitigated 
embrace of the ‘Orient’ as opposed to the ambivalence of the 19th-century philosophers 
discussed in the previous chapter, and the literature of the time demonstrates greater 
awareness of the difficulties of engaging with Buddhist concepts by means of scholarship 
alone. By 1933, Jacques Masui’s Note Sur le yoga et la mystique was to address the 
problematics of European engagement with ‘Asian’ concepts, on the grounds that in his 
view, questioning the nature of being and what lies beyond it occupies too little space in 
Europeans’ lives and thoughts to adequately engage with cultures which centre this.126  
Masui’s article foreshadowed the 1941 special edition of Les Cahiers du Sud entitled 
Message actuel de l’Inde which contained critiques of Orientalism from writers such as 
Benjamin Fondane alongside contributions from Indian writers secured by Masui and 
Daumal and a piece on arriving in France from an Indian perspective.127 Though these 
phenomena indicate greater awareness of the European gaze, and a clear interest in its 
inversion, an unconscious colonialism nevertheless runs through avant-garde interactions 
with Buddhism. There was a particular interest in the Tibetan and Zen forms of 
Buddhism, and avant-garde interactions with these forms make such a colonialism 
discernible.  
 
In the case of Tibet, the interweaving of colonial ambition, scholarly work and popular 
accounts of the country with perceptions of Tibetan Buddhism created a powerful 
mythology around it and its religious traditions to which the avant-garde was particularly 
attracted on grounds of its perceived ‘unknowability’ and subversiveness.  Meanwhile, 
early 20th-century Japanese engagement with German 19th-century philosophy and 
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French Idealism was tied to the pan-Asian movement promoted by Okakura Kakuzō. 
Pan-Asianism called for the adoption of European technology and socio-political 
structures in order for Japan to escape colonial rule by countries of greater might, and for 
all Asia to unite against European imperialism. Within this however, was a strong 
Japanese nationalism which called for a return to traditional culture. Suzuki and his 
presentation of Zen have been linked to both pan-Asianism and Japanese nationalism,128 
not least for his participation in the movement called shin bukkyo (literally ‘new 
Buddhism’) which offered a government persecuting older forms of a tradition it deemed 
of step with a modernizing nation, a version more in line with such aspirations. 
Furthermore, mirroring the gestures of concurrent universalism and Japanese 
essentialism inherent to the Pan-Asian ideology, Scharf theorises that at the heart of 
Suzuki’s presentation of Zen as the essence of all religion and philosophy, was a firmly-
held belief in the superiority and uniqueness of Japan. Suzuki can thus be seen to 
contribute to a doubly-attractive European vision of Japan as both ‘exotic other’ and 
‘friendly familiar:’129 By presenting Zen as the essence of all philosophy and religion, he 
opens the door to its practice by people of all faiths and none while retaining the 
superiority of Japan as the seat of  this universal essence, and now the driving force 
behind a new, modernized Buddhism. The ‘friendly familiar’ he presented has been 
roundly criticized, particularly for its articulation in what McMahan has termed the 
‘language of metaphysics derived from German Romantic Idealism, English romanticism 
and American transcendentalism’.130 Suzuki also supported and legitimised European 
mystical groups including Theosophy which presented a highly suspect vision of 
Buddhism. This was particularly true of its Tibetan form, which the Theosophists 
entwined with the popular vision of the country’s unknowability and subversiveness – 
prized by the avant-garde, as shall be discussed – and a white supremacist worldview. 
Given this combination of factors, it is significant that Suzuki’s presentation of Zen, with 
all its problems, is one of the only references for Buddhist concepts cited openly by 
Bataille. 
 
Surrealist writings on Buddhism and the ‘Orient’ at this time tend towards an idealisation 
which serves first and foremost as a weapon in the crusade against what they considered 
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‘occidental’ values. This is exemplified by Antonin Artaud’s two open letters, one to the 
Dalai Lama and the other to the ‘Écoles du Bouddha’, published in La Révolution 
surréaliste of 1925. Both letters decry all that Artaud found degenerate in European 
culture, notably the Church and the modernist notion of progress. He calls on the Dalai 
Lama to: 
 
Adresse-nous tes lumières, dans un langage que nos esprits contaminés d'Européens 
puissent comprendre. Nous sommes environnés de papes rugueux, de littérateurs, de 
critiques… notre Esprit est parmi les chiens131 
 
In the letter to the ‘Écoles du Bouddha’ Artaud’s rhetoric remains full of disgust for 
European values and peoples, and adds violent metaphors wishing for their destruction. 
For example, he calls on the ‘Écoles’ to: 
 
Jetez à l’eau tous ces blancs qui arrivent avec leurs têtes petites, et leurs esprits si 
bien conduits… comme vous, nous repoussons le progrès. Venez. Sauvez-nous de ces 
larves132 
 
Bataille’s friend and collaborator Michel Leiris holds that Artaud and the other 
Surrealists replaced the ‘cult of Reason’ with a cult of the Dalai Lama, as part of a simple 
rejection of the Occident.133 The idealised Orient within which this ‘cult’ sat, and the 
desire to be conquered thereby, indicates the conscious anti-colonialism that brought 
about early attempts at inverting the European lens. Ideas corresponding to those of 
Artaud are found in the writings of André Breton in the same year. In his response to the 
Cahiers du mois enquiry Orient et Occident he writes : 
 
Pour ma part il me plaît que la civilisation occidentale soit en jeu. C’est de l’Orient 
que nous vient aujourd’hui la lumière…Je n’attends pas que l’Est nous 
enrichisse…mais bien qu’il nous conquière134 
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As indicated above, such conscious anti-colonialism is, however, nuanced by an 
unconscious colonialism. It is notable that all bar three of the surrealists never travelled 
to South or East Asia – neither Artaud nor Breton were among their number – meaning 
that it remained for them an ‘eternal other’: a blank canvas onto which could be projected 
idealised societies, values and ideas in direct opposition the those of an Occident 
fashioned equally from their own imaginations. In this case, just as the Orient had 
become a repository of all that Europe lacked, the Occident became a repository of all 
that was negative in European culture. The Surrealists can thus be seen to look to an 
idealised Orient in general and a constructed Buddhism in particular, with scant 
understanding of either and a desire for support of their own projects in mind. The 
conscious anti-colonialism of the Surrealists’ denunciation of Europe, coupled with the 
unconscious colonialism of their projections of an idealised other in support of their own 
projects, is clearly discernible in their anti-colonial exhibition La Vérité sur les colonies 
of 1931. This they undertook in partnership with the Communist Party and in riposte to 
the French Government’s Exposition Coloniale of the same year. The government’s 
exhibition is now infamous for having ‘displayed’ the people of the French colonies in a 
‘human zoo’ alongside their appropriated artwork and artefacts. In spite of the conscious 
anti-colonialism of La Verité sur les colonies however, it arguably exemplifies the 
appropriation of the ‘other’ in support of European projects. The exhibition reflected the 
political, anti-Christian position of the Communist Party and the Surrealists: each room 
contained placards of Marxist slogans and the exhibits merged Christian iconography 
with ‘tribal’ objects and imagery. This associated anti-colonialism explicitly with 
Communism and employed the ‘primitive other’ in the service of the surrealist project to 
undermine the Church. Furthermore, as Westbrook argues, there is an incoherence 
between rejection of France’s ‘civilising mission’ and embrace of the ‘civilising mission’ 
of Communism alongside the celebration of ‘primitive’ art.135 Dhainaut also observes 
that Surrealism picked and chose its references to and ‘borrowings’ from Buddhism, 
from across the Zen, Tantric and Mahāyāna traditions without seeming to clearly 
understand the differences between them, thus creating a Buddhism that served the 
Surrealists’ own purposes. It is also ironic in the context of the anti-colonial exhibition 
that Breton owned several Tibetan artefacts and artworks brought back from European 
expeditions to Tibet, long before their significance was understood in Europe.136 In this 
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sense, he arguably interacts with them more as ‘objets trouvés’ than as works in their 
own right, contextualised in Buddhist cultures and traditions. Once again, this comes 
closer to the attitudes of artists of the Oriental Renaissance than to engagement with such 
cultures and traditions in their own right, or in any new depth. 
 
An emphasis on revolution and revolt against European values was shared by the group 
led by René Daumal which formed around the publication Le Grand Jeu. Early in the 
first issue, Roger Gilbert-Lecomte inferred that this emphasis was widespread in the 
contemporary avant-garde, saying ‘il n’est pas nouveau de dire que toutes les institutions 
sociales de l’Occident…sont dignes de toutes les révolutions’.137 The Grand Jeu group 
had an incendiary relationship with the Surrealists, disagreeing on several key issues, but 
they certainly agreed on this point. Though Daumal refused Breton’s invitation to 
collaborate,    extended in the Deuxième manifeste de surréalisme, he recognised in the 
third issue of the publication that the two groups shared the aim of ‘action 
révolutionnaire’138 and of accessing a unity beyond the limits of perceived reality through 
‘l’aveuglement amoureux,’ or dreams, or poetry.139 However, the membership of Le 
Grand Jeu maintained that the Surrealists simply applied a set of techniques – automatic 
writing and other ‘petits jeux de sociétés’ – to create work which had become 
commonplace and far from what could be called ‘surreal’.140 As Masson was to infer, in 
his role as a member of the dissident surrealist Rue Blomet group to whom this chapter 
shall return, the focus of surrealist literary and artistic production was on its ends and not 
its means; on the form of the writing and art they produced and not the process of their 
creation. Daumal opposed this focus with what were dubbed the ‘talismans’ of his own 
faction: pieces of art or writing that brought about an ‘instant éternel’ in those who were 
able to experience it.141 The talismans of Le Grand Jeu function in much the same way as 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche described Christian doctrine: an allegory pointing to an 
inarticulable truth. The group as a whole share Breton’s and Artaud’s joy in the idea of a 
Europe ‘conquered’ by an imagined Orient and idealise that Orient, the ‘Oriental man’ 
and the ‘instinct antique’142 as weapons in the fight against European values. In Roger 
Vailland’s review of André Gide’s Colonisation he states that he the others of Le Grand 
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Jeu stand with ‘les noirs, les jaunes et les rouges contre les blancs,’143 saying:  
 
il est probable que les peuples des colonies massacreront un jour colons, soldats et 
missionnaires et viendront à leur tour ‘opprimer’ l’Europe. Et nous nous en réjouissons 
144 
 
In addition to translating, as mentioned, Suzuki’s Essays in Zen Buddhism, Daumal was a 
self-taught scholar of Sanskrit who produced a dictionary of that language and translated 
portions of Buddhist scripture therefrom. He also wrote an informed and highly critical 
review of the French translation of the Bardo Chödol (the Tibetan Book of the Dead)145 
in 1934, to which this study shall return. These credentials suggest that Daumal could be 
described as 'well-read' in a way it is impossible to attribute to Schopenhauer or 
Nietzsche and certainly, as shall be discussed in Chapter Three, to Bataille. In some 
ways, he seems most aware of his Eurocentric perspective, saying: 
 
Faire table rase [des idées européennes]…n’est pas si facile qu’on croit: le faire 
intellectuellement, oui, c’est facile, mais tout cet appareillage idéologique vous tient 
aussi au corps, au cœur146 
 
Daumal’s role in the transmission of Tibetan and Japanese Zen Buddhist concepts to 
André Masson suggests that he may well have played an indirect role in the 
communication of these traditions to Bataille. This is especially probable given the 
closeness of the Bataille-Masson friendship and working relationship during the 
Acéphale period and the apparent influence of both traditions on Bataille during this 
time, to be discussed in the following chapter. Such a line of transmission could be said 
to have been an authoritative one, coming as it did from a more reliable source. However, 
the same unconscious colonialism is discernible in the work of Daumal and Le Grand jeu 
as it is in that of the Surrealists. Much like the violently anti-European rhetoric of Artaud 
and Breton, the anti-colonial statements of Le Grand jeu are easy to make from a 
privileged, hypothetical position. They are also ironically Eurocentric and self-motivated, 
weaponising as they do a vast number of cultures and peoples under the banner of ‘good’ 
as a projected opposite to a European ‘evil’. 
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The most striking revolt of the loose collective known as the Rue Blomet group (named 
after the address of their meeting-place at André Masson’s apartment) was that which 
they undertook against the surrealist movement, famously resulting in Breton 
‘excommunicating’ them in 1929. A key site of the group’s criticism of Surrealism was 
the orthodox boundaries they attributed to that movement’s search for the absolu, which 
they attempted to achieve through freeing the psyche from the constraints of rationalism. 
However, in 1941, Masson – chiming with Daumal’s critique of ‘ends over means’ 
discussed above – would refer to the Surrealists as making of their striving for the 
irrational ‘quelque chose d’aussi borné que le rationalisme honni’ which led to their 
mainstream acceptance. Meanwhile, Bataille’s attraction for dissident Surrealists reposed 
upon the fact that as a ‘“mad”, uncontrolled philosopher’ who exceeded the boundaries 
of the surrealist project,147 he produced work that amounted to a ‘war cry [designed to] 
capture the moment in which we moderns come undone’:148 this amounted to exceeding 
the boundaries of the profane – the world of project inhabited by the Surrealists – in 
order to glimpse the sacred. This, the status of war as one of the explicit aims of 
Acéphale and the influence of Zen satori on Bataille’s conception of the sacred is 
explored in the following chapter. Further criticism of the Surrealists came in the form of 
Masson’s belief that they entered into a duality of liberating, or worse faking liberation 
of, the psyche in order to make such liberation their ‘theme’ – and a marketable one at 
that. This superficiality, Masson explicitly links with the fact that they are European: 
 
L’identification superficielle avec le cosmos, le faux «primitivisme» ne sont que des 
aspects d’un panthéisme facile…il y a lieu ici de faire la différence avec l’esprit 
extrême-oriental, qui tout naturellement n’accorde à la personne que peu 
d’importance, pas du tout d’indépendance, de liberté; laissant toute l’indépendance à 
l’universel, à la substance absolue. Ce mouvement est difficilement compris par les 
Occidentaux, ou devient chez eux, le plus souvent, inauthentique149 
 
Masson’s criticism, like Masui’s before him, is reflective of the conscious anti-
colonialism inherent to his acknowledgement of the difficulties of European engagement 
with South and East Asian traditions. It also points to a simultaneous, unconscious 
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colonialism: aside from the reductive and othering idea of the ‘esprit extrême-oriental’, a 
slightly smaller-scale reduction than the ‘noirs, jaunes et rouges’ cited above, the 
application of the term ‘inauthentique’ here is telling. In using it, Masson can be seen to 
afford himself – Breton’s fellow European – the authority to decide what is ‘authentically 
“oriental”’. 
 
The Buddhist influences most prevalent in the avant-garde were what Dawson would call 
a ‘westernised’ understanding of Tibetan Buddhism and Japanese Zen. Such a 
westernisation relied heavily upon European colonial history in both Tibet and Japan, 
however in the case of Japan this was not limited to the imperial ambitions of European 
countries alone. As touched upon above, the role of Japanese nationalism as a response to 
European imperialism, and that of Suzuki specifically, has proven key to European 
understandings of Japanese Zen and Tibetan Buddhism. 
 
Turning first to Tibet: as a country, it was (and remains) a perfect vehicle for conscious 
anti-colonialism and unconscious colonialism, and European perceptions of Tibetan 
Buddhism have long been inextricably entwined with those of Tibet itself. As Lopez puts 
it: ‘we might regard Tibet as a work of art, fashioned through exaggeration and selection 
into an ideal with little foundation in history’.150 The ‘artworks’ to which Lopez refers 
proved particularly attractive to the anti-capitalist, anti-modernist projects of the avant-
garde.  It is telling to note, for example, that Foljambe attributes the ‘overheated drama of 
Tibet’ to surrealist interest in the form of Buddhism practiced there151 (as well as the 
‘drama’ of Tibetan religious rituals and imagery, and exoticized accounts of Tibet in the 
travel writing available in Paris at the time, ‘overheated drama’ likely refers to the 
struggles between Britain and Russia for control of the country during the Great Game 
and the first Chinese attempt at colonizing Tibet in the early 20th century). Bishop and 
Lopez concur that in literature and popular culture, from Sherlock Holmes to Walter 
Benjamin’s 1929 essay on Surrealism,152 to Artaud’s letters, Tibet has stood for a 
mysterious ‘other’ that exists in the European imagination and to support European 
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concerns and projects.153 As Woodcock puts it: ‘Tibet’s isolation, its persistent non-
adherence to the world culture of the capitalist enterprise and nation-states that developed 
during the nineteenth century, made it the ideal seedbed where personal fantasies might 
be nurtured and clothed deceptively with experience’.154 Such isolation and ‘non-
adherence’ are themselves European constructs: the struggle of the British and Russian 
forces during the Great Game was one for strategic control of a Tibet existing 
tantalizingly on the borders of a colonized India and a China ‘opened’ to trade by force. 
It was ‘isolated’ only from European control and the culture it did not adhere to was 
European in origin, spread to its colonies but certainly not of the world. Such cultural 
imperialism is the backdrop for a wealth of attempts by white Europeans to enter, explore 
and document Tibet during the 19th and 20th centuries and led, for Bishop, to a binary 
representation of Tibet as either worthy of ‘unquestioning and naïve adulation’ or of 
‘arrogant picking and choosing of the bits that could prove useful’.155 This context 
situates Masson’s remark that Daumal introduced him to the practices of ‘secret Tibet’156 
in a canon of European attitudes to the country and its people that extend back to the 
Jesuit missionaries and continue in European popular culture and imagination today. 
 
Bataille’s own interwoven attraction to the country and religious traditions of Tibet are 
first apparent in his letters to his cousin Marie-Louise from Madrid, at a time when he 
was in the midst of losing his Catholic faith. They are contextualised by his desire at that 
time to travel widely, preferably to the ‘Orient’. He writes: ‘je suis seulement obligé de 
rappeler qu’en particulier le 23 août 1920 j’étais on ne peut plus, préoccupé d’aller en 
Orient’.157 This sets his interest in Tibet within a wider perception of an imagined Orient 
within which his attraction to the country is based variously on the difficulty associated 
with the journey, the cold and altitude, the idea of a ‘«voyage» comme ascétique’ and the 
tradition of polyandry.158 Here the colonial narrative of exoticised other is perceptible: 
for Bataille, Tibet exists as a landscape to be conquered; an exotic ‘other’ offering the 
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possibility of a spiritual quest. His Tibetan studies at the École des Langues Orientales in 
the early 1920s159 points to further interest, however these studies were short-lived and 
his later understanding of the country and its religious practices, as well as of Zen, may – 
as mentioned – be attributable to Masson and by extension Daumal. In addition to such 
indirect transmissions, in the journal Documents edited by Bataille, his close friend and 
collaborator Michel Leiris also showed an interest in Tibetan meditations on emptiness, 
using them to analyse the work of Joan Miró160 and writing on Tibetan practices based on 
his reading of Alexandra David-Néel.161 It may thus be argued that Bataille’s interest in 
the interwoven country and practices of Tibet extends back to the mid-1920s and evolves 
through the study of its language, his interactions with Masson and potentially Daumal 
and Leiris. 
 
As regards Japan and Japanese Zen, at the same time as the German Idealists and early 
European Buddhist scholars discussed in the previous chapter were beginning to look 
outside the European philosophical tradition, the mid-1800s saw the beginning of 
Japanese modernism. Sparked by the realisation, with US warships on their doorstep 
demanding to trade, that if Japan did not adopt the superior technology of the European 
world then they would become subjugated to it, the Meiji restoration of 1868 was a time 
of uncertainty as the feudal system came to an end and elements of ‘Western civilisation’ 
were adopted.162 As mentioned above, Meiji policies were two-fold: ‘westernisation’ in 
the arenas of military might, science, technology and government along with the study of 
European philosophical traditions, and simultaneous reaffirmation of Japanese values in 
the arena of culture. It was this seemingly dichotomous phenomenon that lay behind 
Okakura Kakuzō’s pan-Asianism, which with his famous opening line ‘Asia is one’, 
served as an ultimate rejection of European colonialism.163  
 
The discovery of French Idealism was of crucial significance to Franco-Japanese 
relations and to French understanding of Zen, with Ebersolt arguing that the discovery of 
French philosophy is ‘inséparable du processus [politique] d’occidentalisation’ during 
the Meiji period.164 A German social model had been adopted in Japan after the defeat of 
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France at the hands of Prussia in 1870, and for this reason German philosophy was 
studied in Japan from the 1880s while French literature was studied but its philosophy 
ignored. The break with this trend came with the introduction of Bergson in 1910 by 
Nishida Kitaro, and Bergsonism exploded in the following years. Ebersolt notes that the 
attraction of Bergson was owed in great part to the value he placed on spiritual 
experience over and above intelligence, as well as his notions of intuition, duration, 
creation and élan vital.165   One of the many Japanese students to have studied 
philosophy in Paris during the 1920s, Kuki Shūzō drew a parallel between the thought of 
Bergson and the meditation practice of Zen, saying: ‘Le Zen…consiste en un effort 
pour saisir l'absolu par l'intuition. Et dans la pensée japonaise c'est lui précisément qui a 
frayé la voie à la philosophie de M. Bergson’.166 In the case of European understanding 
of Japanese Zen, then, the European colonisation discussed hitherto is inflected by the 
colonial ambitions of Japan: mirroring the adoption of Buddhist concepts for European 
projects, Japan strove to adopt elements of European structures in service of their own.  
 
As well as affecting Japanese understanding of philosophy, it has also been argued that 
Bergson was also a silent influence on Bataille: crucially to this study, Fourny queries 
whether Bataille’s opération souveraine approached ‘un bergsonisme qui n’ose pas dire 
son nom’ alongside the influence of Nietzsche.167 Bergson’s acte libre does indeed bear 
resemblance to Bataillean sovereignty, as shall be discussed in the following chapter, 
being as it is a momentary breakthrough of the ‘moi profond’ (that of inarticulable 
emotion) from the ‘moi modeste’ of the quotidian. The acte libre also requires an 
intensity of emotion along with destruction of the ‘arrangements raisonnables’ of social 
convention. In turn, both concepts mirror Zen satori and kenshō. Bataille refers to the 
former in SN while Bruno explicitly compares Bataille’s methods of meditation with the 
latter. These influences are explored further in Chapter Three.  
 
Zen is often understood to be a subversive rejection of scripture in favour of practice as a 
direct route to enlightenment. Many, including Suzuki, define it in the terms attributed to 
Bodhidharma (considered the 28th patriarch of Zen responsible for bringing what became 
the Ch’an tradition to China, evolving into Seon in Korea and Zen in Japan): 
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A special transmission outside the scriptures 
No dependence upon words and letters 
Direct pointing at the human heart 
Seeing into one’s nature and the realisation of Buddhahood168  
 
For the Rinzai Zen school of which Suzuki writes, this practice was that of the kōan: the 
posing of unanswerable and paradoxical questions or riddles; for the alternative Sōtō 
school it was zazen: seated meditation. Rinzai and Sōtō are the principal forms of Zen 
practiced in Japan and both rely to an extent on what Masson called the ‘non-mental’, in 
the sense of freedom from thought and discourse. Masson compares Bataille’s focus on 
the ‘non-mental’ in his denigration of Dada and Surrealism with Zen. Given this explicit 
equation on Masson’s part, it would not be improbable to suggest they had discussed it. 
He writes: 
 
«Dada? – pas assez idiot », c’est en ces termes que Georges Bataille conclut notre 
premier entretien …Ainsi jaillit cette réponse mémorable, digne d’un moine zen…Oui, 
Dada, pas assez idiot, et le surréalisme beaucoup trop « mental »…J’insiste: ce non-
mental que Georges Bataille préconisait…Ce non-mental, qui est au centre de la 
doctrine zen169 
 
It is important to note however, that the polarised representation, popularised by Suzuki, 
of Zen as a rejection of scripture in relation to older forms of Buddhism lacks nuance: 
Zen masters were and are well-versed in Buddhist doctrine, with Zen schools tending to 
place an emphasis on the Lotus sutra. While Avens for example holds that Suzuki 
‘succeeded in his great ambition to make the reality of Zen accessible to the Western way 
of thinking…without perverting it,’170 this view is highly questionable. Not only does 
Suzuki equate key Zen concepts with Christian ones as mentioned earlier, but his 
popularisation of a Zen free of Buddhist doctrine encouraged practitioners to ‘highlight a 
technique of meditation [for example Rinzai kōans or Soto zazen] that can be 
appropriated and interpreted by different traditions and used to their own ends’.171 Both 
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Masson’s and Bataille’s understandings of Zen and Tibetan Buddhism can be seen to 
serve their own ends in a similar way. In addition to the issues above, Suzuki also 
legitimised the ‘Buddhism’ of one of the most problematic European spiritual sects of the 
time, that of the Theosophical Society. The influence of this group cannot be overstated 
as a vehicle for the transmission of an outlandish and frankly damaging presentation of 
Buddhist concepts and traditions to Europe and the USA. As part of his theory of the 
‘westernisation of the East’, Dawson interrogates Theosophy, asking how much is it is 
‘counter-cultural’ versus how much it conforms to ‘western’ culture given its ‘self-
conscious and selective remodelling [of ‘eastern’ traditions]’ in line with their own 
projects.172 Founded in 1875 by the Russian occultist Helena Blavatsky and American 
military officer Col. Henry Steel Olcott, the Theosophical Society aimed like Acéphale to 
create a new religion, in their case in response to a decline in Christian belief.173 
Blavatsky’s view of Buddhism was that it was ‘incomparably higher, more noble, more 
philosophical and more scientific than the teaching of any other church or religion’174 
and she took the lay precepts to become the first European Theravadin. Meanwhile, 
Olcott became the first European-American to convert to Buddhism. In spite of this, what 
was taught by the Theosophists (largely through publications such as Esoteric Buddhism 
by AP Sinnet) was far from the doctrines and practices of South and East Asian 
Buddhism. This did not hinder its being widely accepted in Europe and the USA, 
however, that the two were equivalent. Among the Theosophists’ more questionable 
beliefs was the existence of a congregation of ‘Mahatmas’, white sages who were the 
conservers of the ‘wisdom of Atlantis’, living in secret in Tibet and concealed even from 
Tibetans. Blavatsky claimed that she lived with the Mahatmas – also known as the ‘Great 
White Brotherhood’ – for seven years and that outside this time she and other 
Theosophists communicated with them through dreams, visions, letters that materialised 
in her cabinet, and automatic writing.175 The fact that the Mahatmas were white points to 
the Theosophical movement as a prime example of Europeans borrowing from South and 
East Asian traditions and cultures to reinforce white supremacy: although it aimed to 
create a ‘universal brotherhood regardless of race, creed, sex, class or colour’176 
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Blavatsky claimed to have studied a work called the Book of Dyzan in the secret language 
Senzar, which described a racial hierarchy of seven ‘root races’ and seven ‘sub-races’. In 
this hierarchy, the Aryans (Greeks, Egyptians and Phoenicians) drove the ‘yellow and 
red, brown and black’ races into Africa and Asia’.177 In Esoteric Buddhism a Mahatma is 
reported as saying that: ‘the highest people now on earth (spiritually) ….is the last 
subrace of the fifth [root race]– yourselves, the white conquerors’.178 
 
The 1927 translation of the Bardo Chödol was made by prominent Theosophist Walter 
Evans-Wentz and was the text from which the French translation was made by 
Marguerite La Fuente. Lopez notes that this book is one of the primary channels that has 
served diverse European agendas and that it is vital to be cognizant of Evans-Wentz’s 
Theosophical beliefs when reading it. Despite claiming that he aimed only to be the 
‘mouthpiece of a Tibetan sage, of whom I am a recognised disciple’, there is nothing to 
suggest Evans-Wentz was ever anything of the sort, or indeed even a follower of Tibetan 
Buddhism.179  Daumal, in his review of the translation, is damning of Theosophy and of 
both Evans-Wentz and Sir John Woodroffe, praising the translator for putting the latter’s 
introduction at the back as it is written ‘dans le plus pur style de sacristie 
théosophique’.180 It is ironic given Daumal’s excoriation of the Theosophists that Suzuki, 
author of his translation of Essais sur le bouddhisme Zen, should have lent legitimacy to 
Theosophy and also brought it to a Japanese  audience. Tweed’s account of Western 
occult influences on Suzuki in the first two decades of the 20th century details the latter’s 
earlier involvement with the followers of Emanuel Swedenborg. Swedenborg was a key 
influence on Theosophy, claiming – like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche – that the ‘true’ 
Christian religion had been obscured by the doctrine that sprang up around it. His own 
writings were based on spiritual experiences rather than Christian theology, and it was 
not only Suzuki who noted parallels with Buddhist traditions in Swedenborg’s 
discussions of the self, emptiness and interdependence.181 Suzuki was introduced to 
Swedenborg by British-American ‘Buddhist sympathiser’ Albert J Edmunds182 and 
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called him ‘the Buddha of the North’,183 translating four of his works in the early 20th 
century and writing a book on his life and work in 1913. Like Theosophy, 
Swedenborgianism claimed Tibetan origins: Vetterling, a Theosophist who in 1887 wrote 
Swedenborg the Buddhist; Or,The Higher Swedenborgianism: Its Secret and Thibetan 
origins, initiated Japanese contact with Theosophical ideas by sending their writings to 
‘young reform-minded Japanese Buddhists’184 (i.e. those of the shin bukkyo movement) 
who published Theosophical writing and supported the idea of founding a branch of 
Theosophy in Japan. Suzuki’s wife Beatrice Erskine Lane Suzuki, a member of the 
Theosophical society, then opened a Theosophical Lodge in Kyoto in the 1920s 
alongside her husband185 and Suzuki lectured at the San Francisco branch of the 
Theosophical Society from 1903, referring to the movement as ‘the real Mahāyāna 
Buddhism’.186 
 
Reminiscent of the pan-Asian movement itself, Suzuki’s role in the promotion of a 
Europeanised understanding of Zen was on the one hand singularly Japanese: an 
exoticised other that undermined the superiority of the European worldview, thus 
appealing to the avant-garde. On the other, it was recognizably European: an accessible 
object of study connected to familiar philosophical and spiritual movements, thus 
affirming the legitimacy of the European worldview. His Zen thus sat within the pan-
Asian project while his involvement with Theosophy is linked to his legitimisation of the 
latter’s presentation of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. As is to be discussed in the 
following chapter, it was Suzuki’s Zen, transmitted through Daumal and Masson, and the 
version of Tibetan Buddhism to which Suzuki contributed, that Bataille would galvanise 
in support of his own projects thus refracting them into the wider avant-garde and his 
own readership. Such galvanisation of Buddhist traditions also constituted a form of 
weaponisation within the Acéphale group, who were explicit in their declaration of war 
on ‘tout ce qui est reconnu aujourd’hui’.187 It is to Acéphale’s weaponisation of 
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Bataille’s Buddhism: Sovereignty, Satori and the Sacred 
Je ne veux plus parler d’expérience intérieure 
(ou mystique) mais de pal. De même on dit le zen 
 
Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche188 
 
How she hated words, always coming between her 
and her life…ready-made words and phrases, 
sucking all the life-sap out of living things 
 
  DH Lawrence, Lady Chatterly’s Lover189 
 
This chapter explores Bataille’s interactions with the imagined Orients and 
Buddhisms discussed in the previous chapters. It will be shown that Bataille’s 
‘Orient’ carries the legacy, both direct and indirect, of early European 
understandings and accounts of Buddhist traditions, 19th-century scholarship and 
philosophy, his peers and the available popular literature (most pertinently 
Alexandra David-Néel, whose accounts of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhist practices 
are suggested here as a vital influence).  Bataille’s weaponisation of Buddhism, 
like that of his avant-garde peers, takes place in the service of his own projects, in 
this case Bataille’s individual interest in anti-Christianity and inter-related anti-
capitalism, and the Acéphale group’s stated aim of waging a metaphorical war 
against ‘tout ce qui est reconnu aujourd’hui’.190 As regards this war, the views of 
the philosopher Heraclitus and of Nietzsche were highly influential: both held war 
to be an essential part of the world in its totality, and the emergence of this 
influence in PJDM shall be discussed. In addition to the waging of war, Bataille 
was to confirm some twenty years after the activities of Acéphale, his interest in 
founding a new religion through the society:  
 
J’avais passé les années précédentes avec une préoccupation insoutenable : 
j’étais résolu, sinon à fonder une religion, du moins à me diriger dans ce 
sens191 
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The meditation practices documented in the papers of Acéphale and the 
‘descriptions’ of PJDM were a central part of this new religion, which privileged 
silence and solo meditation.192 Within them, Dawson’s ‘westernisation of the 
East’193 is discernible in their piecemeal borrowing from Zen and Tibetan 
Buddhist concepts and practices, which this chapter argues was influenced by 
Bataille’s ‘transmission’ through his European sources. Many of the concepts first 
developed in PJDM re-emerge and are consolidated in SA, MM and LPM, which 
will be used throughout this chapter to illustrate such through-lines. 
 
The influence of Tibetan and Japanese Zen Buddhism, ‘westernised’ in Dawson’s 
terms in service of Bataille’s interests is evident by EI, in which  he writes of 
having been able to attain the states of the ‘mystics’ for around two years before 
he began to think of putting together a ‘method’ but that this was 
‘indépendante…des présuppositions auxquelles les mystiques l’imaginent liée’.194 
This reads as a reference to Christian, Buddhist, Hindu and Tantric 
‘presuppositions’ of which he was aware at the time of Acéphale, and which he 
claims to have replaced with ‘de longues réflexions sur l’érotisme et le rire’.195 
Eroticism and laughter are both forms of Bataillean sacrifice in that they represent 
a rupture with the profane world allowing for a momentary eruption of the sacred. 
This is the expérience intérieure of the book of the same title and may be 
considered to be at the heart of that work. In LC, Bataille describes such a rupture 
as a sovereign moment arising in him in a fit of madness in the depths of the 
forest. This he compares with the erotic moment, separating the spaces of the 
lovers’ room and the forest in which he experiences madness, from the spaces 
outside which are those of the profane sphere: 
 
Hors du bois comme hors de la chambre, l'action utile est poursuivie, à 
laquelle chaque homme appartient. Mais chaque homme, dans sa chambre, 
s'en retire…ma folie dans le bois règne en souveraine196 
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By MM, two years after his notes on satori in SN, Bataille would align the 
expérience intérieure with the opération souveraine, where the designation 
opération arguably highlights the fact that the achievement of sovereignty is a 
process, one which this chapter will argue was influenced by the process of 
attaining satori. The process demands ‘sovereign’ behaviours entailing angoisse 
such as ecstasy, laughter and eroticism, mirroring the ‘fiery baptism of the 
spirit’197 by which Suzuki described satori. Bataille writes ‘Précédemment, je 
désignais l'opération souveraine sous les noms d'expérience intérieure ou 
d'extrême du possible. Je la désigne aussi maintenant sous le nom de : 
méditation.198 Two years earlier in SN, he had equated the expérience intérieure 
with Zen, writing as in the epigraph to this chapter: ‘je ne veux plus parler 
d’expérience intérieure (ou mystique) mais de pal. De même on dit le zen’.199 
This triangulation of Zen, expérience intérieure and meditation along with the 
violent metaphor of ‘impalement’ (a Rinzai ‘shock’ tactic if ever there were one) 
prompts this chapter to argue that Bataille was strongly influenced by Zen satori. 
The ways in which this influence is discernible in Bataille’s interest in the sacred 
and the profane, and in sovereignty, shall be discussed. In so doing, the means by 
which satori is achieved as well as its effects (notably what it reveals as regards 
the ‘fundamental nature’200 – as Bodhidharma is said to have put it – of humanity) 
will be shown to have been under construction in PJDM and to have continued to 
interest Bataille in the SA and beyond.  
 
Ebersholt designates an interest in the limits of language as a key point of 
intersection between ‘Japanese thought’, Bergson and French philosophy in 
general. The limits of language is also well-noted as one of Bataille’s principal 
concerns, and this emerges with force in his struggle between the desire to, and 
the possibility of, sharing his meditations with his contemporaries. This desire 
was a fraught one, given that Bataille like Nietzsche before him tussles throughout 
his work with such a conflicting desire and indeed with the possibility of 
communicating in language at all. As he put it : ‘la communication profonde veut 
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le silence’.201 As shall be discussed, for Bataille the state of silence is a dual one 
from language emerges and into which language dissolves: ‘silence’ thus carries 
the meaning of both a tool and a state, and in this Bataille’s meditation mirrors 
that of Buddhist traditions. Moreover, he differs from his 19th-century influences 
by the very fact that he is specifically concerned with developing a practice rather 
than with academic or philosophical engagement with Buddhist traditions. Indeed, 
a reading of PJDM as a practical version of Nietzsche’s ‘active nihilism’, 
influenced by both the process of satori and by Tibetan Buddhism, shall be one of 
the principal concerns of this chapter. 
 
In addition to Bataille’s own texts, the limited work on his understanding of 
Buddhist traditions and meditation practices both reflects and refracts an Orient 
imaginaire in the service of his own projects, incorporating Droit’s culte du néant 
and Dawson’s ‘westernisation of the East’. Paralleling descriptions of 
Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s understandings of Buddhism, for example, 
Hussey declares that Bataille was ‘well-read in Classical Hinduism and 
Buddhism’.202 This in spite of the fact that the examples he gives of Bataille’s 
reading include no primary texts in either tradition and that his list of Bataille’s 
sources pertaining to Buddhism gives only Alexandra David-Néel and Mircea 
Eliade’s work on mystical Tibetan practices.203 At the time of Acéphale, Bataille 
had access only to the travel writing of the former. It is undoubtable that David-
Néel provided one of the first and most detailed accounts of the lives of ordinary 
Tibetans and of Tibetan Buddhist practices: the first white woman to enter Tibet, 
she learned several dialects of Tibetan, converted to Buddhism and became a 
Lama. She also adopted a Tibetan son and travelled incognito with him from 
China to Lhasa, disguised as a peasant and staying in locals’ houses along the 
way. The work of David-Néel displays a conscious anti-colonialism and 
simultaneous unconscious colonialism comparable to those of the avant-garde 
groups discussed in the previous chapter (Indeed, she was a key source of 
information for many of them, Leiris included, on Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism). 
For example, she holds her fluency in the language responsible for a fundamental 
shift in her formerly fixed, European ideas, saying that the knowledge she gained 
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from being able to interact on a par with ordinary Tibetans is no less interesting 
than that she gained from the Lamas and recognising that she has ‘apporté 
instinctivement mes notions européennes dans un pays où elles n’ont point de 
place’.204 In spite of this however, she perpetuated markedly colonial tropes, not 
least in her description of Tibetans – including her adopted son – as little more 
than ‘grands enfants’.205 Her own unease at losing her white superiority through 
her disguise, which has been called her ‘most arduous performance’206 is also 
evident in her risking discovery on two occasions to demonstrate her knowledge 
of the Dharma in discussions with high Lamas.207 As one of the most popular 
writers on Buddhism, of whom Bataille borrowed five works from the 
Bibliothèque Nationale between 1933 and 1937,208 such tropes were disseminated 
to him as part of a wider context in which his ambivalence to Buddhism and the 
‘Orient’ in general existed. Such ambivalence, in addition to the assumption of his 
place to comment on traditions of which he knew little, is evident when Bataille 
admits not only that he knew little of India but that what he did know left him 
with a mindset ‘plus d’éloignement que d’acceuil’.209 Furthermore, in spite of his 
recognition and intermittent praise of his Buddhist influences, like both 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche Bataille’s focus was consistently on how Buddhism 
could support his own projects, in this case the development of his meditation 
practice. His ambivalence is clear in EI where he writes that ‘l’Église bouddhique 
[a une] fin negative: la suppression de la douleur’.210 This mirrors Nietzsche’s 
disdain for what he considered the ‘passive nihilism’ of a ‘Buddhist’ suppression 
of pain that precluded self-overcoming and suggests a transmission to Bataille not 
merely of this Nietzschean understanding but, once again, of the broader concept 
of Buddhism as a culte du néant. In this sense, as shall be discussed further, 
PJDM may be understood to interact with Nietzsche as a practical version of 
‘active nihilism’ that simultaneously inverts Nietzschean sovereignty to 
encompass the embrace of death. 
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Bataille’s anti-Christianity, like others before him from Voltaire to Nietzsche, is a clear 
motive for his interest in an Orient imaginaire. In Bataille’s case however, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, Christianity was tied to capitalism. Conner illustrates this in his 
remark that ‘a world…of means and ends, of sacrifice for profit within a finite economy of 
calculation, is a world structured according to the values of Christian morality’.211 It is this 
world that PJDM, with its focus on useless expenditure, rejects. In it, as in LPM (which he 
began writing in 1939, the same year PJDM was published), Bataille rejects the capitalist, 
Christian worldview through what this study argues is a recourse to an imagined ‘Orient’ 
and its religious traditions, among them Zen and Tibetan Buddhism. Like his antecedents 
from Voltaire to Nietzsche, Bataille’s ‘Buddhism’ may be seen to function as a riposte to 
Christian – and now capitalist – doctrine. Unlike them, and as mentioned above, rather 
than an academic or philosophical argument his riposte takes the form of a practice: a 
lived, shared experience which he, along with the other members of the secret society, 
were developing at the time of Acéphale. As is clear from the very title of PJDM, Bataille 
is concerned with the practice of joy before death and with the attempt to share this state, 
not its academic discussion. This sits within the wider context of the community of 
Acéphale’s centring of silence and of meditation.212 As opposed to the theoretical approach 
of its ‘exoteric’ twin, the Collège de Sociologie, the ‘sacred conspiracy’ of Acéphale 
foregrounded the experience of the sacred, synonymous with both individual and 
communal ecstasy brought about by meditation. To elaborate on this meditation: Bataille 
referred to the concept of joie devant la mort as a ‘formula for mystical meditation [that] 
relates to a joy felt when facing the certainty of death and to the foundation of a religious 
existence that is quite distinct from Christianity’.213 Bataille’s ‘formula,’ though it bears 
some resemblance to the Gnostic Christian methods of which he knew, does indeed depart 
radically from traditional Christian meditation and shows signs of influence by Buddhist 
traditions. Firstly, as Griswold states, ‘the focus of meditation is on the law of God, 
involving the mind. The purpose of meditation is “that you may observe to do” everything 
that is written in the law’.214 Meanwhile, though Buddhist meditation practices share what 
may be called the ‘purpose’ of the cessation of suffering (nirvāna), practitioners should not 
approach meditation as a means to an end. To do so would be to attach oneself to one’s 
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own idea of nirvāna, thus excluding the possibility of accessing it as it truly is. From 
Griswold’s definition, it may also be said that Christian meditation focuses upon bringing 
the practitioner into accordance with God’s law: with the world as it should be. 
Meanwhile, Buddhist meditation practice brings about in nirvāna an apprehension of the 
world as it is. In the case of Zen, Bodhidharma is famously reported to have said (this is 
notably recorded in a work read by Masson) that ‘Zen means ‘for a man to behold his 
fundamental nature’”.215 For Bataille, a significant part of the world as it is and of our 
‘fundamental nature’ is the fact of our death: the fact from which, as he writes in EI, we 
distract ourselves by means of the ‘narcotics’216 of work and project but that his mystique 
de la joie devant la mort embraces in what he would deem a sovereign act. When he writes 
in LC that ‘le mystique devant Dieu avait l'attitude d'un sujet [mais] qui met l'être devant 
lui-même a l'attitude d'un souverain’217 he is setting the sovereign ability of the mystique 
de la joie devant la mort to look being (including death) full in the face in opposition to the 
Christian who looks only at God and therefore remains a mere subject. In other words, he 
is setting his as it is against the Christian as it should be. 
 
The ‘narcotics’ of work and project mentioned above were part of what Bataille would call 
the realm of the profane. His interest in the sacred and the emergence thereof from the 
profane was, as indicated above pursued in the theoretical sense through the ‘public face’ 
of the Collège de Sociologie, which adopted the Durkheimian distinction of sacred from 
profane218 and took an ethnographic approach to this sacred and its inter-relations with 
sacrifice and community. Meanwhile, the rituals and meditation practices of Acéphale 
were concerned with bringing about the eruption sacred from profane through literal 
sacrifice (most famously a discussed, though not performed, human version). This was 
intended bring the community together in identification with each other and with that 
which (or whom) is sacrificed.219 In the same source of Masson’s cited above, a famous 
dialogue between the Emperor of China and Bodhidharma is reproduced:  
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Emperor: You will be interested to hear that I have built many monasteries, distributed 
scriptures, given alms, and upheld the Faith. Have I not indeed acquired merit? 
Bodhidharma: None at all. 
Emperor: In what then does true merit consist? 
Bodhidharma: In the obliteration of Matter through Absolute Knowledge, not by 
external acts 
Emperor: Which is the Divine and Primal Aspect of Reality? 
Bodhidharma: Reality has no aspect that is divine220 
 
This exchange chimes with Bataille’s interest in sacred and profane: building monasteries 
and distributing alms with the aim of building merit exist in the world of what Bataille 
might call the profane; the world of useful activity and of project, and which Bodhidharma 
here calls ‘reality’. Further influence of the sacred and the profane emerges in Bataille’s 
remarks on Tibetan Buddhism. It is known that Bataille often worked on several projects 
simultaneously and that the order of publication does not reflect the order in which his 
ideas were being developed, a pertinent case being his development of LPM at the same 
time as PJDM. By the time it was released in 1949, LPM included a section entitled La 
Société désarmée, a revised version of  Le paradoxe du Tibet published in Critique in 
1947.221 Part book review of Charles Bell’s biography of the 13th Dalai Lama, part theory 
of Tibetan monasticism as a mode of expenditure tailored to a ‘closed’ country, La Société 
désarmée clearly perpetuates Bataille’s ‘westernised’ (in Dawson’s terms) understanding 
of the country and its mythology. While demonstrating some knowledge of Tibetan 
history, the role of monks in Tibetan society, and the British influence in Tibet – including 
the fact that they could not bear having a place that was closed to trade and that this was 
the motivation behind their military action in the country – Bataille expresses the 
romanticized vision of Tibet as an ‘enclave de civilisation paisible222 that was morally 
permissive but remained ‘fermé aux Blancs’223 and tantalizingly inaccessible. The piece 
also reveals more of the influence Tibetan practices had on Bataille’s own when he refers 
to Tibetan doctrinal debates and meditation practices as having had the effect of ‘putting to 
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sleep’ the thirteenth Dalai Lama’s awareness of political necessities.224 While ‘political 
necessities’ may seem to belong firmly in the realm of the profane, chiming with the 
‘narcotics’ of work and project discussed above, Bataille’s ‘putting to sleep’ may also be 
read in a similar way to Nietzsche’s ‘passive nihilism’. For Bataille, the Dalai Lama’s 
training had prepared him only to sit passively, shut off from the world, as it was invaded 
first by the British and then by the Chinese. Much like Nietzsche’s ‘active nihilism,’ 
Bataille’s practice would go beyond the Tibetan ‘putting to sleep’ as well as the ‘narcotic’ 
of the profane. Where Bataille differs from Nietzsche, as discussed above, is his inversion 
of Nietzschean sovereignty discernible in the embrace of death by the mystique de la joie 
devant la mort. However, though he dismisses the meditation techniques of Tibetan 
Buddhism, his technique of dramatisation (the use of images, real and imagined to, as 
Bruno articulates it, ‘ouvrir dans la psyché une brèche’)225 has strong parallels with the 
Tantric Tibetan visualisations of which he read in the work of David-Néel. The following 
finds particular echoes in MH, as shall be shown:  
 
Le célébrant souffle dans le kangling (la trompette faite d’un fémur humain) conviant 
les démons à la fête qui se prépare. Il imagine une déité féminine qui personnifie sa 
propre volonté. Celle-ci s’élance hors de sa tête, par le sommet du crâne, tenant un 
sabre à la main. D’un coup rapide, elle lui tranche la tête226 
 
The ‘breaching’ of the psyche referred to by Bruno demanded violent means akin to those 
cited in the visualisation above: in the case of MH these included the world in flames, the 
screaming woman with her hair on fire,227 and in its early drafts two female deities: one 
war-like; the other cannibal and self-cannibalising. Such deities bear resemblance to the 
female deity mentioned in David-Néel’s text but also to other wrathful female deities in the 
wider Tantric tradition including Kali on whom Bataille wrote in Documents228 and 
Chinnamasta (appearing as Chinnamunda in Tibet). Given the resemblance that the self-
decapitating latter goddess bears to the figure of the Acéphale, this is worthy of further 
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investigation though sadly outside the scope of the present study.229 By EI Bataille would 
present dramatisation as a means of self-loss, supporting Hussey’s claim that joie devant la 
mort functions as a ‘concentration upon the dissolution of fixed identity’ entered into 
through his ‘mantra’.230  
 
Si nous ne savions dramatiser, nous ne pourrions sortir de nous-mêmes. Nous vivrions 
isolés et tassés. Mais une sorte de rupture – dans l’angoisse – nous laisse à la limite des 
larmes : alors nous nous perdons, nous oublions nous-mêmes et communiquons avec un 
au-delà insaisissable 231 
 
Bruno’s observation that Bataille’s dramatisation cannot be attained without silence232 sits 
alongside Hegarty’s observation that silence is the result of excess rather than a 
meditational tool: ‘Bataille is going to drink, fuck, and stumble, braying into a pit that the 
self cannot withstand’.233 As well as the limits of language, the role of silence itself in 
Bataille’s work is widely discussed, and in the case of his meditation practice it may be 
argued that much like the practices of Buddhist traditions, silence is both outward and 
inward. In this sense, outward silence becomes a condition for dramatisation, and 
dramatisation a tool by which inward silence, in the form of the ‘pit that the self cannot 
withstand’ is attained. For Bataille, such an ‘inward silence’ occurs in his sovereign 
moment. To clarify this term: the concept of ‘sovereignty’ occurs in Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche and Bataille, carrying different meanings in each case. What unites their 
definitions, however, is the destruction of what may be read as a Brahmanic ātman leaving 
a minimal self in its wake. Schopenhauer’s sovereignty is the negation of the Will resulting 
in annihilation: a state of ‘bliss’ in which ‘only cognition remains’ that he explicitly 
compares to nirvāna.234 However, as discussed in Chapter One, what also necessarily 
remains is what Zöller calls a ‘selfless self’: an ‘active -less’ that must exist to carry out the 
negation of self.235 By contrast, Nietzsche’s sovereignty occurs through self-overcoming, a 
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term – as also discussed in Chapter One – which in spite of his describing the self as a set 
of competing drives, necessarily denotes a self to be overcome and a self (however 
minimal) to do the overcoming. More explicitly indicating a self akin to ātman is his 
description in BGE of ‘an unchangeable “I am this” which he calls a ‘granite of spiritual 
fate’.236 As shown above, Bataille’s sovereignty differs from that of Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche in that it is communitarian rather than individual: it relies upon communication. 
Bataille’s sovereignty appears to come closer to Buddhist anātman than either 
Schopenhauer’s negation of Will or Nietzsche’s self-overcoming. However, as shall be 
discussed in more depth shortly, it retains like both a ‘minimal self’. 
 
It can be understood that the ‘absolute knowledge’ of which Bodhidharma speaks in the 
discourse cited earlier is the means by which the profane ‘reality’ of matter is obliterated. 
Similarly, for Bataille the emergence of the sacred occurs, as discussed, through the 
community’s identification with each other during sacrifice. This, Bataille calls 
communication,237 writing in LC of the revelation of ‘truth’ by means of the loss of self 
which occurs therein: 
 
La vérité n’est pas là où des hommes se considèrent isolément : elle commence avec les 
conversations, les rires partagés, l’amitié, l’érotisme et n’a lieu qu’en passant de l’un à 
l’autre…le monde ne ressemble à aucun être séparé et se fermant, mais à ce qui passe 
de l’un à l’autre quand nous rions, quand nous nous aimons : l’imaginant, l’immensité 
m’est ouverte et je me perds en elle. Peu importe alors moi-même et, réciproquement, 
peu m’importe une présence étrangère à moi238 
 
These glimpses of the sacred; these sovereign moments, bear comparison to the flash of 
insight that is satori, often referred to through the metaphor of the lightning strike to 
illustrate its ‘unexpected onrush…into the ordinary field of consciousness’.239 The nature 
of the lightning strike is explained in Suzuki’s section on the history of Zen in Essays in 
Zen Buddhism. His account privileges Hui-neng, the sixth of the Chinese patriarchs whose 
teachings were the basis of Ch’an’s growth into a distinct school as opposed to an obscure 
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sect. ‘Unlettered’ and concerned with ‘dynamic’ meditation that differed from calm sitting, 
Suzuki writes that Hui-neng’s ‘simple-mindedness not spoiled by learning and 
philosophising could grasp the truth at first hand’.240 A central part of Hui-neng’s teaching 
is the coming of enlightenment as an abrupt flash of insight, as opposed to the gradual 
realisation taught by his contemporary Sheng-hui, and Suzuki maintains that ‘all true 
mystics are followers of the “abrupt” school’.241 The image of the lightning strike is 
pertinent to the practices of Acéphale: central to their ‘new religion’ was the invention of 
rituals, which would galvanise the formation of new bonds in the community, and among 
these were the initiation rites of new members which took place at a lightning-struck tree 
in the forest of Marly.242 Given that the metaphor of the lightning strike is one to which 
Bataille turns to articulate his sovereign moment in PJDM and SA, it is possible to read the 
lightning-struck tree as a visual representation of this moment. In a footnote to the final 
line of the third meditation in PJDM (‘Je me représente l’instant glacé de 
ma propre mort’),243 Bataille describes the moment ‘X’ felt himself struck by lightning 
during a dream. ‘X’ was dazzled and transfigured, and attained the ‘inespéré’ before 
waking.244 This lightning imagery describes a similar state, brought about by violent 
rupture, to satori, which evolves in SN when Bataille writes:  
 
Un peu avant la guerre, je rêvai que j'étais foudroyé. Je ressentis un arrachement, une 
grande terreur. Au même instant j'étais émerveillé, transfiguré: je mourais245  
 
It is reasonable to assume therefore that Bataille himself is the ‘X’ described in PJDM. 
 
In addition to the creation of a new religion, Acéphale considered themselves to be waging 
war against, as has been mentioned, ‘tout ce qui est reconnu aujourd’hui’.246 The Greek 
philosopher Heraclitus, and Nietzsche’s interpretation of his work, had a seismic effect on 
Bataille and the entire Acéphale group, who shared the view of both philosophers that war 
was simply part of the as it is of the universe. Bataille’s MH with its opening line ‘JE SUIS 
MON-MÊME LA GUERRE was born of this Heraclitan influence, which fellow Acéphale 
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member Pierre Andler declared equal to that of Nietzsche himself.247 Bataille read 
Heraclitus in the Autumn of 1927, and Morando remarks that from the moment of their 
schism with Surrealism in 1928, Masson and Bataille set about creating a universe 
‘proche d’Héraclite’.248 Bataille writes in his analysis of Nietzsche’s writings on Heraclitus 
in the second issue of Acéphale that: ‘Parce qu'Héraclite a vu la loi dans le combat des 
éléments multiples, dans le feu le jeu innocent de l'univers, il devait apparaître à Nietzsche 
comme son double, comme un être dont il a été lui-même une ombre’.249 Bataille’s 
conception of Heraclitus as a ‘double’ of Nietzsche takes on especial significance in light 
of Abel’s remarks on Bataille’s SN as coming from a place of attempted communication; 
of ‘being-Nietzsche-with-Nietzsche’.250 
 
In the first meditation of PJDM, Bataille positions peace at the other side of war, 
saying ‘Je m’abandonne à la paix jusqu’à l’anéantissement’.251 In this metaphor, peace 
refers not to that from which war erupts but to that which arises upon cessation of 
war.  This mirrors the way at which silence is arrived in his meditations through 
clamouring of discourse or image. Just as life has no meaning except in death, language 
has no meaning except in its dissolution. Bataille would go on to articulate this in LC as 
‘[les] mots n’ont de sens, du moins, que dans la mesure où ils précèdent immédiatement le 
silence (le silence qui met fin)’.252 It is important to highlight at this juncture the crucial 
differences between Christian and Buddhist meditation practices in regard to their use of 
language, and the similarities shared between Bataille’s practice and those of Buddhist 
traditions. Christian commentators put great focus on the importance of language, both 
spoken and written, in the practice of meditation. Strong notes that the Hebrew term means 
‘verbal activity, including muttering, speaking or praying’253 while McAlpine calls 
meditation ‘the devotional practice of pondering the words of...scripture with a receptive 
heart’.254 As opposed to this use of language in Christian meditation as a means by which 
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one brings oneself into alignment with God’s law, all forms of meditation in the Buddhist 
tradition revolve around silence: both the silence in which one sits to meditate and the 
inner silence achieved by stilling the mind. Though the muttering, speaking or praying may 
seem to bear relation to Buddhist chanting or use of mantra, where language is used in this 
latter instance it is to bring about the dissolution of language into the second form of 
silence mentioned above. Bataille’s meditations also revolve around such a dual silence: 
his letter to Isabelle Farner with instructions on how to recite an early version of PJDM 
appears to serve the function of mantra, giving as it does instructions on exactly how to 
recite the lines, specific pauses and all, with the aim of achieving the meditative state. 255 
Bataille’s interest in silence sits in the wider context of a man who, as Surya notes, felt that 
from a young age his ‘affaire en ce monde était d’écrire, en particulier d’élaborer une 
philosophie paradoxale’.256 Central to this paradox is, as Biles has noted, the contradiction 
of a scholar, philosopher and librarian who detested and sought to destroy intellectual 
structures and the form of thought and writing itself.257 Bataille’s sovereign moment is 
intimately linked to this lifelong struggle with the insufficiency of language and 
philosophy, a struggle he shared with both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, though the latter 
ultimately privileges the ‘calm and dispassionate’258 Kantian presentation. All schools of 
Buddhism also emphasise the insufficiency of language to articulate meaning, for which 
reason meditation practice is essential. A famous metaphor for this is of language as a 
finger which points to the moon: it is essential not to focus too much on the finger and 
thereby fail to see the moon: 
 
[imagine] a man pointing a finger at the moon to show it to others who should follow 
the direction of the finger to look at the moon. If they look at the finger and mistake it 
for the moon, they lose (sight of) both the moon and the finger259 
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The same metaphor returns in Suzuki’s essay on the history of Zen260 and in his translation 
of the Lankavatara sūtra:  
 
As the ignorant grasp the finger-tip and not the moon, so those who cling to the letter, 
know not my truth261  
 
Bataille’s agreement with this account of language as a ‘finger pointing at the moon’ is 
discernible in his own attitudes to language throughout his work and life as well as in his 
descriptions of meditation as discussed above. It is also discernible in his recording in SN a 
passage in which Suzuki describes a disciple becoming enlightened upon hearing the sound 
of a stone strike bamboo, and feeling grateful that the master he had asked to teach him had 
refused: his satori would never have arrived had he attempted to learn how to attain it 
through means of language and discourse.  
 
The process of attaining Bataille’s definition of sovereignty represents a further parallel 
with satori as described by Suzuki. As mentioned above, the latter writes that the process 
should be akin to ‘a fiery baptism of the spirit’, varying in intensity depending on how hard 
the practitioner has worked towards satori.262  Elsewhere, he describes the state of 
‘extreme mental tension’ experienced by a monk over a period of days and nights before 
reading a verse that stimulated satori.263 Suzuki also recounts several instances of monks 
attaining satori through physical violence and pain: in one instance a master slams a gate 
into his student’s leg, breaking the leg but affording the student ‘insight into the life-
principle from which the whole universe takes rise.264 In another, a master kills a kitten 
before his students in order to stimulate the flash of insight.265 It could be argued that 
Bataille makes a nod to Suzuki’s ‘fiery baptism’ when he notes in SN that ‘le thème de la 
nuit d’angoisse se retrouve sur quelque forme dans les méditations de l’Asie’.266 However, 
there are pointers to an earlier engagement with the violence of satori. A moment of 
enlightenment experienced as violence is discernible in PJDM, in which la joie devant la 
mort is experienced as a ‘violence intérieure’,267 an experience to be distinguished from the 
 
260 ‘to point at the moon a finger is needed, but woe to those who take the finger for the moon’: D.T. Suzuki, 
Essays in Zen Buddhism (London: Luzac & Company, 1927), p. 6 - 7. 
261 Lankavatara Sutra, trans. by D.T. Suzuki (Boulder, CO: Prajna Press, 1978), p.193. 
262 D.T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (London: Luzac & Company, 1927), p. 231. 
263 Ibid. p. 237. 
264 D.T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (London: Luzac & Company, 1927), p. 11 
265 Ibid., p. 292. 
266 Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), VI, p. 53. 
267 Georges Bataille, ‘La pratique de la joie devant la mort’, Acéphale, 5 (1939), 11–23., p. 12. 
65 
 
Christian ‘béatitude satisfaisante’ which serves to provide an ‘avant-gout 
de l’éternité’,268 Thus, Bataille sets up his own moment of ‘enlightenment’ in the form of 
sovereign joy before death, as a moment arrived at by violent means and distinct from 
Christian salvation. Here, the use of Buddhist ideas to counter the Christian may be 
discerned, which is situated in the wider context of European-constructed Orients 
imaginaires and the theory discussed in the previous chapter of parallel Occidents 
imaginaires. Rather than, as for Nietzsche, the struggle of several facets of the self for 
domination leading to self-overcoming and contingent embrace of the Eternal Return, 
Bataille’s sovereignty relies upon the rupture of individual identity – of the self – through a 
chance encounter such as a lightning strike, or a broken leg. 
 
By the time of SN, Bataille would write that ‘le néant en jeu dans les états mystiques est 
tantôt le néant du sujet’. This, along with Bruno’s statement that, for Bataille, ‘toute notion 
d’être – Dieu aussi bien que la personnalité humaine – s'annihilait’,269 supports the 
argument for a Brahmanic self in Bataille. Bruno’s argument that PJDM’s treatment of the 
flame brings Bataille close to Buddhist selflessness (that is anātman)270 betrays once again 
such a Brahmanic understanding of the self not only in Bataille but in his critics, thus 
displaying the persistence of this long-standing European conflation. In the foundational 
texts of the Pāli canon the flame is a key metaphor for selflessness, while Bataille’s flame 
denotes annihilation. This suggests that, rather than Bruno’s understanding, Bataille’s 
flame demonstrates the fact that his sovereignty – like the negated Will and Nietzschean 
self-overcoming – retains a minimal self. Turning first to the treatment of the flame in 
Buddhist traditions, in the Milindapañha (a dialogue between the Indo-Greek king 
Menander (here called Milinda) and the monk Nāgasena) finds the latter answering 
Milinda’s question of whether we are the same person when born as we are when we die 
with the observation that the flame lit at night is not the same flame that remains in the 
morning:  
 
one element perishes, another arises…therefore neither as the same nor as a different 
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The metaphor of the flame also arises in the historical Buddha’s dialogue with Vaccha in 
the Majjhima-Nikaya. The Buddha posits that one would be aware of the fact a fire had 
started and was dependent upon its fuel, but that it is not possible to articulate where it 
goes when extinguished. The same is true of nirvāna: the forms and the consciousness by 
which we deem someone to exist have ceased and the person attaining nirvāna has been 
released from such attachments. We cannot say they have been annihilated, but we also 
cannot say that they have been reborn.272 Turning to Bataille’s use of the flame as a 
metaphor for self-annihilation: in an earlier draft of MH, Bataille introduces the image of 
fire as an insatiable hunger, saying that it ‘devours in order to consume itself and to give of 
itself without measure’.273 A key part of the meditation is to ‘take on the woeful hunger for 
being and enduring’274 that prevents the ‘free gift of self’ so that ultimately the self can be 
consumed and given of as freely as the flame par excellence and a recurring image in 
Bataille from his earliest writings on, the sun.275 In the published version of MH, this 
extended meditation on the flame is gone, but the représentation of the earth, flung into 
space like a screaming woman with her hair on fire, remains as one of several images of 
sacrifice, (self)-consumption and war.276 By SN, he would use the extinction of the flame 
as a metaphor for the self-destruction inherent to sovereignty: 
 
     …la flamme  
brillante et légère  
se consumant en elle-même  
s’annihilant   
et de cette façon révélant le vide 277 
 
As suggested earlier in this chapter, Bataille’s sovereignty in its embrace of death 
as part of life; as part of the as it is, may be seen to represent an inversion of 
Nietzsche’s sovereign embrace of the Eternal Return. While the latter has been 
compared in Chapter One to samsara,278 Bataillean sovereignty appears at first to 
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come closer to the moment of satori.  This is not a straightforward equivalence, 
however, as shall now be discussed. In his attitude to war, Bataille seems close to 
Nietzsche’s self-overcoming, writing in PJDM: ‘le combat est la même chose que 
la vie. La valeur d’un homme dépend de sa force agressive’.279 Here, accomplir is 
best translated as ‘fulfilment’, and the fulfilment of human possibility which can 
only occur through combat may seem almost a direct nod to Nietzschean self-
overcoming. However, Bataille’s account most explicitly diverges from that of 
Nietzsche as regards the concept of joie devant la mort, of which he writes: 
 
Un homme «vivant» se représente la mort comme ce qui accomplit la vie : il ne 
la regarde pas comme un malheur. Par contre, un homme qui n’a pas la force 
de donner à sa mort une valeur tonique est quelque chose de «mort»280 
 
The idea of one who hides from death being already dead, illustrates Bataille’s 
inversion of Nietzschean sovereignty in the embrace of death: a vital person; a 
‘living’ person, embraces not just life in the Eternal Return, but is fulfilled by 
death. In this sense, Bataille may be seen to avoid the samsāra of Nietzsche’s 
Eternal Return. Bataille’s fulfilment in the joyful embrace of death may also be 
seen to have echoes of Schopenhauer’s end of suffering in Will-negation, but the 
element binding all three together is once again the existence of a self akin to 
ātman: in Nietzsche the self which overcomes and is overcome in order to access 
the Eternal Return; in Bataille and Schopenhauer the self which is destroyed at the 
moment of death. Further insight into the parallels between the Bataillean self and 
ātman may be found in an earlier version of MH,  in which Bataille writes firstly 
of a self that is annihilated by joie devant la mort and secondly of his embodiment 
thereof: this bears comparison to the dissolving of ātman into brahman following 
the annihilation of the former. Bataille describes the universe as possessed of ‘a 
cruel hunger that makes violent demands for my death: it demands it for the sake 
of its boundless appetite, and for its dazzling joy at existing; everywhere it 
demands that everything that has been should be annihilated incessantly’.281 In 
this earlier version he begins the meditation as he does two of the ‘descriptions’ in 
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Acéphale by stating ‘I AM JOY IN THE FACE OF DEATH’282 alongside the 
statement in the final version of MH: ‘JE SUIS MOI-MÊME LA GUERRE’.283 
As discussed above, Nietzsche was influenced by Heraclitus in his views on war, 
both holding that war is one of the realities of the world as it is:284 Bataille, 
closely influenced by both, now embodies both war and death as part of the as is. 
He returns to this embodiment of war as part of a meditation practice in LC, 
writing: ‘assis au bord d’un lit, en face de la fenêtre et de la nuit, je me suis 
exercé, acharné de devenir moi-même un combat’.285 In this, he may be seen to 
indicate that in the final analysis the silence; the war; the sacrifice by which he is 
annihilated, he then becomes. In the sense that (as he writes in the earlier version 
of MH) ‘the inexorable hunger…becomes ME’,286  and (in the published version) 
‘[la] mort n'est que consommation éclatante de tout ce qui était, joie d'exister de 
tout ce qui vient au monde’,287 he has himself become the universe’s joy at 
existing, an existence that inevitably includes death. It is arguable that here lies 
the essence of the PJDM: an explicit practice to embody the universe in its 
totality; that is to say the universe as it is, in the form of an inverted Nietzschean 
sovereignty that includes death as the fulfilment of tout ce qui était. The influence 
of Tibetan Buddhism as a practice which ‘put[s one] to sleep’ is discernible in this 
inverted sovereignty: like Nietzsche’s ‘active nihilism’ Bataille situates his 
practice as the solution to this sleeping draught in order to allow for the sacred to 
break through the profane. The influence of satori is also discernible in regard to 
this breakthrough, in that Bodhidharma’s ‘reality’, void of ‘aspect that is divine’ 
bears resemblance to the profane. Meanwhile, the ‘divine’ of ‘beholding our 
fundamental nature’ bears a parallel resemblance to the sacred. Finally, Bataille’s 
opération souveraine may be seen to resemble the process of achieving satori 
through painful means akin to angoisse, such as the ‘shock’ techniques compared 
to a lightning strike, the killing of a kitten or the crush of a leg in the gate.   
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This study has traced the transmission and evolution of imagined Buddhisms, situated 
within wider Orients imaginaires, from the earliest European interactions with the 
traditions, through Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to the French interwar avant-garde and to 
Bataille in particular. It has been argued that such imagined Buddhisms and Orients were 
born of what Dawson deems the ‘westernisation of the East’ rather than an understanding 
of Buddhist traditions having had an ‘easternising’ effect on the perspectives and output of 
the thinkers discussed herein. A central example with which the study has been concerned 
is that of the confusion of Brahmanic ātman and Buddhist anātman which was crucial to 
European misunderstanding of nirvāna as self-annihilation and of Buddhism itself as what 
Droit calls a culte du néant. The erroneous conflation of ātman and anātman, ironic given 
that the break between Brahmanism and Buddhism owes much to this central difference, 
has been shown to have existed since the early Christian missionaries conceived of a ‘pan-
Asian’ religion fusing the two traditions. It persisted through Voltaire’s doctrina orientalis 
to the early 1800s, up until the emergence of the academic field of ‘Buddhist Studies’. 
Nevertheless, the close-knit group of European scholars involved in that field retained the 
conflation of ātman and anātman and were instrumental in refracting it, along with the 
perception of nirvāna as self-annihilation and by extension Buddhism as a culte du néant, 
into the work of Schopenhauer. The latter’s assessment of Buddhism was then 
unquestioningly accepted by Nietzsche, whose Will to Power depends, as do 
Schopenhauer’s Will to Life and notion of character, upon a self akin to ātman. The 
combined factors of an ātman-like self and nirvāna as self-annihilation emerge in multiple 
references to annihilation and self-annihilation in PJDM, and in Bataille’s treatment of the 
flame in SN. The latter turns a popular Buddhist metaphor for selflessness on its head, 
making of the flame a metaphor for self-annihilation. 
 
A further form of the ‘westernisation of the East’ discussed in this study has been the 
galvanising and weaponising of Buddhist traditions in support of European perspectives 
and projects. For Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bataille this process involved the 
employment of an imagined Buddhism as either equivalent or antagonist to their own 
ideas. This equivalent/antagonist relationship stretches back once again to some of the 
earliest European engagements with Buddhist traditions, notably Christian missionaries of 
the Middle Ages who, seeking to establish the veracity of Biblical chronology, held 
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Buddhist texts (though clearly heretical) to be forms of the Bible.288 Both Catholics and 
Protestants, upon coming into contact with Tibetan Buddhism and discovering such 
features as the monastic system, use of incense and prayer beads, declared it to be a lost (if 
degenerate) form of Roman Catholicism. This the Catholics used to declare their 
superiority, and the Protestants to defame the Catholics.289 In later years, as Europe began 
to question Christian dogma, thinkers such as Voltaire began to use Buddhist traditions in 
support of their own anti-Christianity. approach is shared by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and 
Bataille, all of whom employ the equivalent/antagonist framework to support their own 
philosophies. For Schopenhauer, in spite of the ‘close agreement’ between his own 
philosophy and Buddhism, it is in the final analysis merely an inferior means of fulfilling 
humanity’s need for metaphysics than the ‘calm and dispassionate’290 language of Kantian 
philosophy. For Nietzsche, the ‘passive nihilism’ of Buddhism has more to be admired 
than the slave morality of Christianity, but its perceived willingness to accept 
powerlessness makes it inferior to his own ‘active nihilism’. Bataille’s vehement anti-
Christianity does not make him averse to religion in and of itself, a fact made abundantly 
clear in Acéphale’s self-declaration as FAROUCHEMENT RELIGIEUX and its aim to 
create a new religion. 
 
In an important development since the scholarship and philosophy of Schopenhauer’s and 
Nietzsche’s era, Bataille’s equivalent/antagonist relationship to Buddhism arose in a 
context not just of anti-Christianity, but of a rejection of all that was considered 
‘Occidental’. Acéphale’s war on ‘tout ce qui est reconnu aujourd’hui’ was part of a wider 
rejection of the values seen to have led to the First World War and from which a second 
World War threatened to emerge. This meant that capitalism, modernism and colonialism 
all came under fire as well as Christianity from groups across avant-garde, of whom the 
Surrealists, the dissident surrealist Rue Blomet group and the members of Le Grand jeu 
were discussed in Chapter Two. These groups were unequivocal in their call for the violent 
overthrow of an ‘Occident’ that – as a repository of everything considered undesirable – 
was arguably as constructed as the ‘Orient’ called upon to do the overthrowing. Such an 
atmosphere informed what this study has referred to as a conscious anti-colonialism and 
simultaneous, unconscious colonialism among the members of the groups discussed. It was 
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certainly the case that far more primary texts and more reliable Buddhist scholarship was 
available, with René Daumal, an accomplished Sanskritist, student of Buddhism and 
translator of Suzuki’s Essays in Zen Buddhism, a key figure in this development. A number 
of exhibitions of Buddhist art had also come to Paris, bringing such art and artefacts to the 
attention of the avant garde, while contemporary periodicals reflect an interest in Japanese 
art and culture and in the geographical and spiritual landscape of Tibet.291 Perhaps most 
significantly, there was also a growing awareness of the difficulty of engaging with 
primary sources from a ‘Western’ perspective, strikingly demonstrated in the work of 
Jacques Masui.292 Such evidence of what this study has called a ‘proto-Orientalism’ (in 
Saïd’s sense of the term), though undoubtedly progressive for its era, nevertheless entailed 
an unconscious colonialism. This is evidenced by a continued ‘westernisation of the East’ 
on the part of an avant-garde which galvanised Buddhist cultures and traditions in support 
of their own projects. In the case of Tibet, the ‘mysteriousness’ of the intertwined country 
and its Buddhist traditions, invoked by Artaud as a saviour for Europe, perpetuated long-
standing use of the country as a catch-all ‘other’. Tibet in the avant-garde became, as it 
remains today, an ideal canvas for the projection of anti-capitalism, anti-modernism and 
conscious anti-colonialism. The mystery and spiritual superiority of this mythologised 
Tibet is discernible in Bataille’s reasoning for wanting to travel there on a ‘«voyage» 
comme ascétique’ through harsh and inaccessible terrain.293 It is also, however, infused 
with a reassertion of white superiority. This occurs in Alexandra David-Néel’s 
perpetuation of a lasting colonial trope, that of her description of Tibetan people (including 
her own adopted son, a fellow Lama) as nothing more than ‘grands enfants’294 and is 
strikingly present in the Theosophists’ ‘Great White Brotherhood’ and their claim to the 
superiority of the ‘white conquerors’.295 Japan and Japanese Zen have arguably been the 
subjects of European mythologization in much the same way as Tibet and Tibetan 
Buddhism. This study has shown the ways in which the construction of this mythology 
intersected with that of Tibet and with Japanese colonial motivations. Suzuki’s 
presentation of Zen was evidently crucial to the avant-garde and to Bataille specifically as 
one of their only reference points for the history, practice and concepts of that tradition. It 
is significant therefore, that in spite of the praise accorded to Suzuki for ‘bringing Zen to 
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the West’, the ‘Zen’ he brought has been roundly criticised on all three counts, not least for 
its problematic equations of Christian and Zen concepts. Suzuki may be similarly criticised 
for his contribution to European understandings of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism: by his 
praise of Theosophy and establishment of a branch of that movement in Kyoto, Suzuki was 
instrumental in legitimising the Theosophists’ presentation of Buddhism in general and the 
mythology they built around Tibet in particular. Furthermore, as highlighted in Chapter 
Two, Suzuki’s description of Zen as the essence of all religions served concurrently as an 
affirmation of Japanese universality and as an assertion of Japanese uniqueness and 
superiority. Occurring at the time of the Meiji restoration’s embrace of European military 
and governmental systems, and concurrent reaffirmation of traditional Japanese culture 
associated with rising nationalism, this situates Suzuki’s presentation of Zen within a wider 
relationship of European to Japanese imperialism.  
 
It was argued in Chapter Three that the lineage described above served to transmit the 
elements of Japanese Zen and Tibetan Buddhism employed by Bataille in PJDM and 
weaponised as part of Acéphale’s ‘war’ on the capitalist, modernist and Christian 
worldview. The two traditions were argued to have had particular influence on Bataille’s 
interactions with the sacred and the profane, and on what in MM he was to call the 
opération souveraine. In the case of his Tibetan influences, these were shown to be two-
fold and to exist within the familiar framework of the equivalent/antagonist relationship 
serving ultimately to support Bataille’s own projects. Firstly, the descriptions of Tibetan 
Tantric meditations he read in the work of Alexandra David-Néel have been suggested as 
potential unreferenced inspiration for the violent dramatisations of MH, and in particular 
the figure of a violent female deity which is erased from the final published version. 
Bataille was, however, to dismiss Tibetan meditation techniques as means of ‘put[ting one] 
to sleep’ in the face of pressing political necessity. Like Nietzsche’s ‘active nihilism’ as the 
solution to ‘passive nihilism’, Bataille’s PJDM may be seen to suggest a solution to the 
Tibetan approach, which allows the breakthrough of the sacred.  The breakthrough of 
sacred from profane and the process by which this is achieved were also shown in Chapter 
Three to bear much relation to satori, of which this study has suggested Bataille knew long 
before his specific remarks thereupon in SN (probably through André Masson and, 
indirectly, René Daumal). Suzuki describes the process of achieving satori as one of 
‘extreme mental tension’296 and a ‘fiery baptism of the spirit’,297 a progression which this 
 
296 D.T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (London: Luzac & Company, 1927), p. 237. 
297 D.T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (London: Luzac & Company, 1927), p. 231. 
73 
 
study has argued, parallels the angoisse arising from ‘sovereign behaviours’ necessary to 
the opération souveraine. Furthermore, the ‘fiery baptism’ itself is also described by 
Suzuki as a sudden flash of insight akin to lightning: a metaphor for the emergence of the 
sacred which also occurs in the texts of PJDM and SN as well as being embodied in the 
lightning-struck tree at which the members of Acéphale met. In a source known to have 
been read by Masson, satori is said to arise from what Bodhidharma calls a ‘reality’ that is 
necessarily separate from the ‘divine’ and affords insight into our ‘fundamental nature’. 
For Bataille in PJDM, our ‘fundamental nature’ is one of beings that will die and in the 
view of this study, insight into this fact along with its joyful embrace – la joie devant la 
mort – constitutes the sovereign act in an inversion of Nietzsche’s sovereign embrace of 
the Eternal Return. Ultimately, this study has argued that PJDM amounts to the practice of 
inverted Nietzschean sovereignty, influenced by what has been called the ‘silent 
transmission’ of Tibetan and Japanese Zen Buddhist concepts and practices. 
 
As the first of its kind to focus on the influence of Buddhist traditions in Bataille’s work, 
this study has raised at least as many questions as it set out to address, generating several 
potential avenues of further study. Foremost among these is the interest Bataille and his 
peers share in Tantra, which was not limited to the Tantric practices of Tibet such as the 
meditation referenced by David-Néel. Bataille was at one point planning a work on Tantra, 
and it would be valuable to unpick to what exactly this ‘Tantra’ amounted and how it 
influenced his meditation practice and his work more broadly. The figure of the Tantric 
wrathful deity is of particular interest, emerging in Bataille’s short piece on Kali298 and in 
an early draft of MH. The potential debt owed by the figure of the Acéphale to (self-) 
decapitating wrathful deities upon which this study briefly touched, is certainly worthy of 
particular attention. 
 
There have also arisen in the course of this study two prisms in the transmission of 
Buddhist concepts and practices to Bataille that merit further investigation. Firstly, the role 
of French Idealism was argued in Chapters One and Two to have been instrumental in 
creating a bridge from 19th-century German philosophy to Japan. To this, the work of 
Bergson seems to have been crucial with Kuki Shūzō, one of the first wave of Japanese 
students to study in Paris during the 1920s, paralleling Bergson’s philosophy with Zen 
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practice as an ‘effort pour saisir l’absolu par l’intuition’.299 It was also suggested in 
Chapter Two that Bergson was another of Bataille’s ‘silent’ influences with Fourny going 
so far as to call the opération souveraine ‘un bergsonisme qui n’ose pas dire son nom’.300 
In this sense, the work of Bergson appears to bring about a triangulation of satori, 
sovereignty and acte libre when the latter is, as it has been in this study, compared with 
Bataille’s sovereignty in its breakthrough of the ‘moi profond’ from the ‘moi modeste’. 
The second prism worthy of further study is the relationship between Suzuki’s presentation 
of Zen and European and Japanese imperial motives. Those of Europe are employed in 
Okakura’s Pan-Asianism as an antagonist for Asia as a continent to unite against, with 
Buddhism a key component of this unifying force. This functions much like the way in 
which the early Christian missions and elements of Schopenhauer’s, Nietzsche’s and 
Bataille’s work employ Buddhism as an antagonist to their own proposals. Meanwhile, the 
shin bukkyo of which Suzuki’s presentation of Zen was part, offered up to both a reformed 
Japanese government favouring modernity, and a European audience with a keen interest 
in ‘Eastern’ spirituality, a form of Buddhism aligned with what were considered Western 
ideals and which borrowed European and Christian concepts in its questionable 
communication of Zen. Scharf’s observation that Suzuki’s presentation of Zen as the 
kernel of all religions – universally applicable but distinctly Japanese301 – also mirrors 
colonial European perceptions of their ‘civilisation’ and of the Christian religion as 
universally applicable yet distinctly European. The details of this Euro-Japanese 
interaction and its reverberation not only into the French interwar avant-garde but to 
present-day European understandings of Zen, would make for greater understanding of the 
role of Buddhism as a ‘weapon’ employed concurrently by European nationalists, 
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